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HOW PERIOPERATIVE NURSES DEFINE, ATTRIBUTE CAUSES OF, AND 
REACT TO INTRAOPERATIVE NURSING ERRORS 
 
Robin Chard, PhD 
 
Duquesne University, 2006  
 Errors in nursing practice are a growing concern in healthcare posing a 
threat to patient safety. Practitioners have been hesitant to come forward and report errors 
because of negative ramifications in the workplace. Few studies have approached error 
management through the eyes of the clinician or have studied how nurses cope or change 
their practice after committing an error. Studies on nursing errors have traditionally used 
floor/unit nurses as the sample population. This study used an often unseen and highly 
specialized group known as perioperative or operating room registered nurses.  
 This study was a descriptive, correlational design using a survey to obtain 
information. Perioperative registered nurses (N=272) who were members of the 
Association of periOperative Registered Nurses (AORN) participated in the study. From 
this sample, 158 participants admitted to committing an intraoperative nursing error. The 
conceptual framework that guided this study was Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) 
cognitive theory of psychological stress and coping. 
 Results showed that nurses who used accepting responsibility as a coping strategy 
after committing an error tended to experience high levels of emotional distress (r = .55, 
p = .000). Relationships were shown between the strategy of planful problem solving 
with constructive changes in practice (r = .34, p = .000), and the strategy of escape-
avoidance with defensive changes in practice (r = .52, p = .000). Using multiple 
regression analysis, the strategies of accepting responsibility (   = .34, p < .001) and using 
      
iv 
self-control (   = .17, p < .05) were found to be significant predictors of emotional 
distress. Seeking social support (   = .20, p < .05) and planful problem solving (   = .29, p 
< .001) emerged as significant predictors of constructive changes in practice. The most 
predictive of defensive changes was the strategy of escape-avoidance (   = .35, p < .001). 
 Outcomes that are identified from the process of error management should 
include measures intended to promote learning from the error and interventions designed 
to prevent future errors. This study provided evidence that perioperative nurses 
experienced a variety of emotions after committing an error which led to alterations in the 
way they practiced. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Operating room nursing has been recognized as a specialty in hospitals since 
1901. As early as 1860, Florence Nightingale described it as the cornerstone of basic 
nursing care (Nightingale, 1859/1946). Although a high percentage of operating room 
nurses work in the intraoperative setting, the specialty has sought to be more inclusive by 
referring to operating room nurses as perioperative nurses. Perioperative nurses generally 
possess well-developed critical thinking skills as well as competent, safe skill 
applications in caring for patients undergoing surgical intervention.  
The care that perioperative nurses provide to patients is largely unknown to the 
general public since their care is rarely observed. This is due to the inaccessibility of the 
operating room suite in comparison to more traditional nursing units and departments. 
Often, patients are unable to remember their surgical experience because they are 
unconscious or anesthetized with medications that impose an amnesic effect. As a result, 
perioperative nurses remain somewhat anonymous to and seldom receive feedback from 
patients. These and other characteristics of perioperative nursing contribute to its identity 
as a specialty often described as hidden behind closed doors. This study seeks to 
encourage perioperative nurses to emerge from behind the closed doors, remove their 
surgical masks, and contribute to the growing body of knowledge on perioperative 
nursing errors and patient safety.
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A. Background of the Study 
Prior to publications by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) on medical errors, the 
American public was unaware of the concerns being generated in health care regarding 
patient-related complications and deaths from errors. Although data from the studies used 
in the IOM’s first report were almost a decade old, the information presented was new 
and shocking to the general public (Leape, Berwick, & Bates, 2002). The public was in 
disbelief when it was calculated in To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System that 
an estimated 44,000 to 98,000 deaths occurred annually in the United States as a result of 
medical errors (Corrigan, Kohn, & Donaldson, 2000). Adverse events specifically 
occurring in surgery were included in the overall statistics. This report was part of an 
initiative of the IOM to actively compile a comprehensive assessment of health care 
quality related to patient safety in the nation’s health care system.  
The second IOM report, Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for 
the 21st Century (IOM, 2001), focused upon improving the quality of care that currently 
exists in America’s health care system. The IOM’s more recent report, Keeping Patients 
Safe: Transforming the Work Environment of Nurses (IOM, 2004) attended to the effects 
that nurse work environments have on patient safety.  
Prior to any of these reports, the American Medical Association (AMA), 
American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) participated in the first conference 
on health care errors (Leape et al., 1998). In 1997, the AMA founded the National Patient 
Safety Foundation (NPSF); its mission is to promote safety within the health care system. 
It supports the theory that errors will occur due to the complex nature of the health care 
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system. Therefore, its focus is to identify risks inherent in the system as well as develop 
ways to prevent errors.  According to the first IOM report (Corrigan, Kohn, & 
Donaldson, 2000), an error is defined as "the failure of a planned action to be completed 
as intended (i.e., error in execution) or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (i.e., 
error in planning)" (p. 27). The Harvard Medical Practice Review I was one study that 
provided the data for the IOM report, and its method was a retrospective medical record 
review (Brennan et al., 1991). Leape (2000) concurred with the report, and found three 
reasons to support the results including (a) the adverse events found actually existed, (b) 
some adverse events were missed due to underreporting or concealment, and (c) many 
adverse events occurred after patient discharge. The IOM only reported medical errors in 
the hospital environment. Therefore, errors occurring in other practice contexts were not 
identified or reported (Wears & Leape, 1999).   
As early as 1991, the Harvard Medical Practice Study I reported that 4% of 
hospitalized patients had incurred some type of injury from an error, in which 70% may 
have been preventable (Brennan et al., 1991). The results of this early study led to further 
research on adverse events outside the United States (Vincent, Neale, & 
Woloshynowych, 2001). Bovbjerg, Miller, and Shapiro (2001) showed that medical 
errors account for more injuries and deaths than occur from plane crashes and workplace 
accidents. In addition, 2 to 3% of hospitalized children, especially those with special 
needs, are affected by medical errors (Slonin, Ahmed, & Joseph, 2003).   
Healthcare errors involve different health care professionals including nurses, 
pharmacists, and physicians. Because earlier research methods used retrospective reviews 
of medical charts, it proved difficult to accurately identify and categorize the numerous 
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variables contributing to errors. Much of the information presented in the reports was 
medical in nature, with data primarily from medical research. As the reports on medical 
errors evolved, the focus moved toward identifying what processes contribute to errors as 
opposed to only addressing statistical data on the numbers of errors. More studies are 
needed that address the actual context of how error occurs, which variables are 
attributable to its cause, and how the individual involved in the error perceives the 
experience. Aside from medicine, other practice disciplines, in particular nursing, need to 
be included in the mounting research on patient safety and errors. 
Perioperatve Nursing Context 
 The discipline of nursing has many practice specialties; however, perioperative 
nursing is contextually and theoretically distanced from more visible nursing specialties.  
Perioperative nursing often is considered technical, task-oriented, and medical-model 
driven. Perioperative nurses have been struggling to shed the label of “handmaiden to the 
surgeon”, as they were viewed in the early beginnings of perioperative nursing 
(Gruendemann, 1970). A main tenet of nursing in general is the communicative bond 
between nurse and patient, and a perceived lack of real-time involvement with the 
surgical patient has contributed to a professional insecurity pervading the specialty (Riley 
& Manias, 2002).  
 The perioperative therapeutic nurse-patient relationship begins in the preoperative 
phase. The relationship continues in the intraoperative phase even though oral 
communication is reduced. Patients have often remarked that the physical presence of the 
perioperative nurse provides them comfort during this stressful experience. However, 
pressure to reduce turnover time and improve performance limits time for the 
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perioperative nurse to nurture the relationship. Lack of public knowledge about 
perioperative nursing indicates a continued sense of invisibility. This invisibility may 
contribute to the lack of research in perioperative nursing especially in the area of nursing 
errors. Often, public interest and need drives research. If the public is unaware of the role 
that perioperative nurses play in their care, they may take for granted perioperative 
nurses’ responsibilities in managing positive patient outcomes.   
 Clinical practice for perioperative nurses is specialized and quite different from 
nursing in traditional inpatient nursing units, further isolating nurses from their 
colleagues, both physically and experientially. Many undergraduate nursing curricula do 
not include discrete perioperative clinical learning activities, leaving students to pursue 
the perioperative nursing specialty only post-graduation. The pervasive feeling of 
detachment and disconnection may impart a feeling of powerlessness in managing an 
error, whether it is committed by a nurse or another team member. Fear of repercussions, 
ostracism, and other negative feelings may contribute to nurses’ unwillingness to discuss 
or report errors, leading to speculation on the actual numbers and types. Learning about 
errors from the perspective of the nurse begins a working dialogue on how to manage 
these stressful experiences.   
 I have 20 years of perioperative nursing experience and have witnessed first-hand 
the uncertainty felt by perioperative nurses regarding errors. Questions have arisen as to 
who is responsible for errors in surgery even though specific job descriptions are 
provided and written policies and procedures delineate role responsibilities.  
Circumstances further clouding the issue of errors relate to intimidation by surgeons and 
lack of assertiveness on the part of the nurse. Nurses function within a team and are 
            
            
            
           
  
  6 
encouraged to cultivate a team atmosphere, but they encounter problems such as 
miscommunication when time, resources, and conflicting personalities pose threats to 
patient safety. In addition to uncertainty as to role and responsibility, what constitutes 
intraoperative nursing errors has yet to be clearly defined by perioperative nurses. 
Because registered nurses are legally responsible for their own practice, what constitutes 
errors that may breach the standard of practice should be clear.  
 Perioperative nurses view themselves as advocates because patients are very 
vulnerable during the surgical experience. Patients literally put their lives into the hands 
of the surgical team and rely on it to provide safe, quality care. It is my intent to give 
voice to perioperative nurses so that their thoughts, actions, and feelings may be 
communicated to others on the critical issues of nursing errors and patient safety. Thus, I 
investigated the aftermath of error including how perioperative nurses cope with 
committing errors and how the experience influences practice. 
Cultural Context 
In an effort to reduce errors, the IOM recommended that mandatory reporting be 
required for hospitals, and encouraged voluntary reporting by health care professionals 
(Leape, 2002). In 1995, the Department of Veterans Affairs revised its risk management 
policies to require mandatory reporting of patient injuries caused by negligence or 
accidents (Kraman & Hamm, 1999). Patients wanted to know if an error was committed 
especially if harm was a result. Patients cited the severity of error, and honesty and 
admission by the physician as being related to whether or not they considered litigation 
(Gallagher, Waterman, Ebers, Frazier, & Levinson, 2003; Witman, Park, & Hardin, 
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1996). Wu (1999) recommended that physicians disclose errors as well as close calls to 
patients.   
 The pervading culture of a health care facility dictates its approach toward 
recognizing and mediating error in the workplace. Leape et al. (1998) reported that a 
culture characterized by anger, fear, distrust, and blame can be remodeled into one of 
safety, honesty, and fairness. Mustard (2002) proposed that culture is a product of social 
learning, and as people learn from one another through behavior and thought, they can 
meet the primary objective of patient safety.   
In 1998, the United States Pharmacopeia (USP) established MedMARx, an 
internet-based system for reporting medication errors in an anonymous and confidential 
manner (Snowbeck, 2001). Healthcare facilities pay a yearly fee for access to the 
database. In 2002, the USP reported an increase in error reporting of 82% with a database 
growth of only 11% (Rubin, 2003). This increase may be related to changes that occurred 
over time in some organizations that encouraged voluntary reporting of errors. However, 
change is occurring gradually and many institutions have been slow to respond, thereby 
continuing to perpetuate a culture of silence and blame. Anonymity in reporting shifts the 
blame away from the reporter and provides vital information to the facility in combating 
errors through continuous quality improvement initiatives. Feeling comfortable in 
reporting errors and close calls informs the institutional leadership that members of the 
health care team are equally committed to reducing error. According to Anderson and 
Webster (2001), successful incident reporting mechanisms are anonymous.  
 Error investigation is rarely straight-forward and not specific to one professional 
domain. Approaches to managing error may focus on the person or system. A 
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paradigmatic shift in the cultural climate in healthcare regarding errors must occur in 
order to adequately deal with errors. A blame-discipline type of structure only drives 
error reporting underground and limits an institution’s ability to address errors. Wolf and 
Serembus (2004) found that heath-care professionals who committed medication errors 
experienced more non-supportive responses such as probation, verbal reprimand, and 
firing as compared to supportive actions. These actions on the part of administrative 
personnel impeded efforts to encourage error reporting.  
 A culture characterized by blame, guilt, and fear causes suppression and cover-up 
on the parts of practitioners and organizations (Leape et al., 1998). In addition, this type 
of culture reflects the assumption that most injuries are due to incompetence or 
negligence on the part of the practitioner. Healthcare practitioners face both personal and 
professional demands when involved in an error, and fear weighs heavily in their decision 
to report an error. Promotion of a supportive environment from both administration and 
co-workers is paramount toward managing error from a humanistic, problem-solving 
approach.  
B.  Purposes of the Study 
 The purposes of this study were to: 1) examine the definitions, circumstances, 
perceived causes, and reactions of perioperative nurses to intraoperative nursing error; 
and 2) examine the relationships among coping with intraoperative nursing errors, 
emotional distress, and changes in practice due to error.   
The specific aims of the study were as follows: 
1. Define intraoperative nursing errors. 
2.  Determine the occurrence of intraoperative nursing errors. 
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3.  Identify the causes of intraoperative nursing errors as perceived by perioperative 
 nurses. 
4. Describe how nurses react to intraoperative nursing errors. 
5. Describe how nurses cope with committing an intraoperative error. 
6. Examine the relationship between coping with intraoperative nursing errors and 
changes in practice. 
7. Examine the relationship between coping with intraoperative nursing errors and 
emotional distress. 
C.  Research Questions 
The research questions for the study were as follows: 
1. How do perioperative nurses define intraoperative nursing errors? 
2. What are the circumstances of intraoperative errors? 
3. What are the perceived causes of intraoperative nursing errors?   
4. To what extent do perioperative nurses experience emotional distress after 
 committing an intraoperative error? 
5. How do perioperative nurses cope with committing an intraoperative error? 
6. What is the relationship between coping with intraoperative nursing errors and 
changes in practice? 
7. What is the relationship between coping with intraoperative nursing errors and 
emotional distress? 
D.  Definition of Terms 
Circumstances of the error: Conditions under which the error occurred including 
timing, the nurse’s years of perioperative nursing experience, patient age, type of 
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surgical procedure, patient level of function prior to the error, time of anesthesia, and 
effect of the error on the patient.   
Coping : behavioral and cognitive strategies used by perioperative nurses in 
managing the aftermath of committing an intraoperative nursing error as measured by 
the subscales of accepting responsibility, seeking social support, distancing, self-
control, planful problem solving, and escape/avoidance in the Perioperative Nurse 
Questionnaire. 
Emotional distress: the reactions of perioperative nurses to committing an 
intraoperative error as indicated by their responses in the Perioperative Nurse 
Questionnaire. 
Changes in practice: alterations in clinical nursing practice as measured by the 
variable subscales of defensive and constructive changes in the Perioperative Nurse 
Questionnaire. 
Causes of error: explanations for the error as measured by the operating room 
atmosphere and the variable subscales of inexperience, job overload, lack of 
supervision, and faulty judgment in the Perioperative Nurse Questionnaire. 
E.  Assumptions 
The following assumptions were made in this study: 
1. Perioperative registered nurses possess the requisite knowledge, skills, and 
experience to respond to questions on intraoperative nursing errors. 
2. Perioperative registered nurses are willing to provide information on nursing 
errors truthfully. 
            
            
            
           
  
  11 
F.  Limitations 
 A limitation of the study was that the sample of perioperative nurses reflected 
only those nurses who were members of AORN, not from the general population of 
perioperative nurses. Therefore, the results from this study may not be generalizable to all 
perioperative nurses.  
G.  Significance to Nursing 
 The significance of this nursing research study lies in improving professional 
nursing practice through the ability to identify errors and take the necessary steps to 
prevent reoccurrence. Identifying how perioperative registered nurses define 
intraoperative nursing errors may provide a beginning taxonomy on errors specific to the 
operating room context. This study provided insight into the circumstances surrounding 
intraoperative errors as well as perceived causes. Learning if perioperative nurses 
experience emotional distress and how they cope with errors enables other perioperative 
nurses and health care professionals to understand better the often painful and stressful 
implications that result from committing an error.  
 Studies such as this may lead to the development of cognitive-behavioral 
interventions based upon nurses’ coping strategies. Being aware of others’ experiences 
reveals a humanistic side to error while the error is analyzed through a formal process. 
Giving voice to clinicians empowers them to discuss and offer solutions for prevention of 
future error. In the pilot study for this project, one participant spoke knowingly of the 
distressful feelings incurred after committing an error and how the process of writing 
down the experience helped the healing process. The participant wrote the following: 
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Thank you for the opportunity to fill out the two questionnaires. I was able to heal 
from them. Since this incident I have lost many a [night’s] sleep. I have realized 
that my supervisor really hates me. I pray daily for myself and for her and for the 
patient. Unforeseen events occur. We must go on and try to do better. 
 
This narrative suggests that perioperative nurses need to talk about committing an error 
and learn how to lessen its impact upon the nurse and patient. Additional research may be 
stimulated in this understudied context and population, leading to further discovery into a 
subset of nurses often perceived as silent and reticent.
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II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
A.  Introduction 
  Responding to a charge from the government, accrediting institutions, and 
the public to discover the reasons why errors occur in the health care system, the 
multidisciplinary health care community has begun to compile a body of evidence on 
patient safety and errors. The growing body of literature reflects a multitude of variables 
affecting patient safety. Approaches to error management represent a large portion of the 
existing literature on patient safety and will be discussed in this chapter. The review of 
the literature is a summary and analysis of research related to the cognitive theory of 
psychological stress and coping, and medical and nursing errors. Because there are few 
studies attending to intraoperative nursing errors specifically, studies of nursing errors in 
different contexts and specialties as well as other disciplines are also presented. Lastly, 
gaps in the literature will be identified and the chapter summarized.  
B.  Conceptual Framework 
   The conceptual framework that guided this study was the cognitive theory 
of psychological stress and coping (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The major concepts of 
the theory are stress, cognitive appraisal, and coping. The theory contends that people use 
various cognitive and behavioral strategies to manage the stress of daily life. Lazarus and 
Folkman proposed that stress is a transaction between person and environment, as 
           
 14 
    
   
opposed to an isolated intrapsychic struggle. How a person perceives and manages stress 
depends upon an individual’s ability to adapt and cognitively appraise the experience.  
Coping is a process by which a person makes physical or psychological adjustments 
when confronted with internal or external demands. Two major functions of coping, 
dealing with the problem causing the distress (problem-focused coping) and adjusting the 
emotion involved in the distress (emotion-focused coping), are thought to be used during 
stressful events. The functions serve to manage the stress process, which involves the 
person, the environment, and the relationship between them (Folkman & Moskowitz, 
2004).     
 Cognitive appraisal is the process by which an individual examines the stressful 
experience, determines what the immediate impact is, and decides what options are 
available for mediating the outcome. Primary cognitive appraisal views what is at stake; 
secondary cognitive appraisal assesses what, if anything can be done. Individuals use 
cognitive appraisal of the environment to determine if a situation may cause disruption of 
their well-being, and if so, to what extent (Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen, & DeLongis, 1986).  
 Coping is dynamic and unfolds based upon an individual’s assessment of the 
situational context. Forms of coping are not necessarily good or bad and are continuously 
being negotiated through cognitive reappraisal. Coping is contextual and often occurs in 
an emotional environment as individuals attend to an event they perceive may threaten 
existing resources of coping (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  
 For this study, the actual occurrence of error was the causal antecedent or stressor. 
Mediating the stressful occurrence depends upon the interaction of specific personality 
and environmental variables (e.g., values, beliefs, situational context). The variables in 
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this study were the definitions, circumstances, and causes of intraoperative nursing errors. 
Research questions 1 through 3 relating to these variables provided the foundation for the 
conceptual framework.  Following the stressful event, subsequent cognitive primary and 
secondary appraisal by the perioperative nurse determined what problem-and emotion-
focused coping strategies were utilized. The adaptational outcomes or effects from the 
experience were reflected in constructive or defensive changes in practice, and the extent 
of emotional distress following the error. The conceptual framework used to guide this 
study is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Stress, coping, and adaptation of perioperative nursing error. 
 
Coping is process-oriented, requiring cognitive and behavioral efforts by an 
individual. Coping strategies may change over time as individuals continue to appraise 
and reappraise their shifting relationship with the environment (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984). Coping may be directed toward changing the environment or changing the 
meaning of the event. Coping with a stressful event may be resolved quickly or require a 
longer period of time.  
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 The processes of appraisal and coping affect adaptational outcomes including 
physical, psychological, and social aspects of health (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). How a 
person functions in work and society, manages life satisfaction, and maintains somatic 
health are quality indicators used to define mental and physical well-being. As previously 
stated, in this study committing an error is the stressor; subsequent appraisal of and 
coping with the error occur next, followed by the adaptational outcomes. The 
adaptational outcomes are reflected in the type of practice changes perioperative nurses 
make, either constructive or defensive. Extent of emotional distress is an adaptational 
outcome reflected as a consequence of coping with an error.  
 A perioperative nurse who commits an error must decide how potentially 
threatening the action becomes and what steps are needed to amend any damage. Coping 
is emotion- focused or problem-focused and its complexity warrants an individual’s 
engagement in different strategies. This framework was used as a basis to determine 
which coping strategies perioperative nurses use after committing a nursing error, and 
which strategies led to constructive or defensive changes in nursing practice. In addition, 
emotional distress was measured as an outcome of coping.   
Forms of Coping  
 Emotion-focused forms of coping are considered cognitive reappraisals by which 
the meaning of a situation may change without it being changed objectively (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984). Cognitive reappraisal may be defense oriented in relation to a distorted 
reality, or may be based upon a pragmatic adaptation of reality. Problem-focused forms 
of coping center on changes within the environment and individual that facilitate a 
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transition and objective analysis of a contextually based problem. Problem-focused forms 
of coping are chosen by individuals based upon a specific situation.  
 The concepts of stress, cognitive appraisal, and coping have been researched in 
numerous studies in the social sciences, medicine, and nursing. A major intent of 
investigators has been to account for why some people deal with stress in their lives 
better than others. According to Folkman and Moskowitz (2004), coping is an attractive 
concept to research since it may generate development of cognitive-behavioral 
interventions through a rich variety of responses to stress.   
Coping Measurement 
 As a way to measure the concept of coping, Folkman and Lazarus (1980) 
developed the Ways of Coping Checklist. It was revised by the authors in 1985 and is in 
the public domain (see Appendix A).  It has a wide range of coping and behavioral 
strategies thought to be used by individuals in managing stressful encounters (Folkman, 
Lazarus, Gruen, et al., 1986). Eight coping scales represent emotion-focused and 
problem-focused forms of coping. The scales measure the context-specific thoughts and 
actions that individuals experience through a self-report format. 
Stress, Cognitive Appraisal, and Coping 
 The literature includes reports of several studies on the concepts of stress, 
cognitive appraisal, and coping. As a point of clarification, stress is conceptualized as a 
relationship between person and environment that may exceed a person’s existing 
resources; cognitive appraisal and coping are the transactional variables within the 
relationship. Past research (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985a; Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-
Schetter, et al., 1986) supported the theory in two studies on coping.  The results from 
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both studies were the basis for the revised Ways of Coping (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985b). 
In addition to the finding that coping is strongly related to cognitive appraisal, various 
coping strategies were used based upon what the participants perceived was at stake as 
well as what options were available. Additional studies examined relationships among 
personality factors, cognitive appraisal, forms of coping, and the adaptational outcomes 
of somatic and psychological health status (DeLongis, Folkman, & Lazarus, 1988; 
Folkman, Bernstein, & Lazarus, 1987; Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen, et al., 1986; Folkman, 
Lazarus, Pimley, & Novacek, 1987). Newer research continues in further defining coping 
in the context of proactive management, social aspects, and emotions (Folkman & 
Moskowitz, 2004). 
Stress and Coping with Error in Nursing and Medicine 
It appears that little research has been reported on the subject of stress and coping 
related to committing an error from the perspective of registered nurses. Most researchers 
focused on physicians as a population. Physicians use problem-focused coping in 
managing mistakes as opposed to emotion-focused forms (Christensen, Levinson, & 
Dunn, 1992). Physicians may have a tendency to act defensively about their mistakes, a 
strategy learned early on in their medical careers. Mizrahi (1984) found that physicians 
used three negative types of coping mechanisms: (a) denial, (b) distancing, and (c) 
discounting in dealing with errors.  
Wu, Folkman, McPhee, and Lo (1991) found that medical officers who coped by 
accepting responsibility for their mistakes reported constructive changes in practice but 
experienced high emotional distress. The emphasis of their questionnaire was to have 
house officers describe their most significant mistake, their response to it, and any events 
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that followed. Wu defined mistake as “an act or omission for which the house officer felt 
responsible that had serious or potentially serious consequences for the patient and that 
would have been judged wrong by knowledgeable peers at the time it occurred” (p. 
2089).   
The participants first were asked to describe their mistake in narrative form and 
then answer questions. A descriptive paragraph written by the participant uncovered rich 
information from the perspective of the medical officer who committed the mistake. 
Grouped concepts identified from the answers to specific items were causes, 
responsibility, physician response, institutional response, and changes in practice. The 
instrument was exposed to two stages of pre-testing before being distributed to 114 
internal medicine house officers. 
Wu used the Ways of Coping (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985b) to measure 
responsibility for the mistake. Two multiple linear regression analyses were done to test 
the independent variables found to be related to the dependent variables, constructive and 
defensive changes in practice. Results indicated that house officers who accepted 
responsibility for mistakes also reported constructive changes in practice. In addition, 
after controlling for cause, severity of outcome, gender, and perception that the institution 
was judgmental, analysis showed accepting responsibility as a coping mechanism led to 
higher emotional distress ( = .58, p < .0001). Participants described feelings of guilt, 
shame, nervousness, and loss of self-confidence. Further analysis found that a judgmental 
response on the part of the health care institution was a predictor of defensive changes in 
practice ( = .37, p < .001), accounting for 29% of the variance in defensive changes. 
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A secondary analysis was conducted on the above data. The coping strategies 
were categorized as predictor variables, and emotional distress, constructive changes in 
practice, and defensive changes in practice as criterion variables (Wu et al., 1991). After 
controlling for the same variables as above, using three multiple regression analyses, 
officers more likely reported emotional distress if they accepted responsibility for their 
mistake (   = .67, p < .0001). Officers were somewhat more likely to report distress if 
they coped by seeking social support (   = .27, p < .05) or controlling their feelings (   = 
.28, p < .07). The total R2 for the emotional model was .47. None of the coping strategies, 
except accepting responsibility, were independently related to constructive changes in 
practice (   = .69, p < .02). Defensive changes in practice were more likely reported if the 
residents coped by escape-avoidance (   = -.06, p < .34). The total R2 for constructive 
changes in practice was .49, and total R2 for defensive changes in practice was .35. 
One of the findings supported current thought that a supportive non-judgmental 
culture is necessary for successful handling of mistakes. Osborne, Blais, and Hayes, 
(1999) found that nurses also expressed the same feelings characterized by the medical 
officers after committing a medication error.  
 The tool used in the study on house officers was revised and administered to 129 
British nurses after an initial pilot in a study on nursing practice errors (Meurier, Vincent, 
& Parmar, 1997). Through the tool, the authors sought to discover how nurses learn from 
their errors and what, if any, changes in practice occurred. In addition to answering 22 
questions about errors, the nurses were asked to write about an error they had made. The 
descriptions were classified into four categories based upon the nursing process. As in the 
Wu et al. study (1991), taking responsibility for the error was correlated with constructive 
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changes in practice (r = 0.43, p < 0.01). Consequently, emotional distress also was related 
to constructive changes in practice (r = 0.36, p < 0.01). If the patient was severely 
affected by the error, there was a tendency not to report the error (p < 0.05) and be less 
trusting of others (p < 0.01). These defensive changes in practice were significantly 
related to fear of repercussions.  
Coping and Health   
 In nursing, the cognitive theory of psychological stress and coping has been used 
in research on patients with renal disease (Mok, Lai, & Zhang, 2004), cancer 
(Wonghongkul, Moore, Musil, Schneider, & Deimling, 2000; Zabalegui, 1999), 
disabilities (DeSepulveda & Chang, 1994; Groomes & Leahy, 2002), premature labor 
(Lowenkron, 1999), and cardiac arrest (Cowan, Pike, Budzynski, & Kogan, 2001). 
Levesque, Ducharme, and Lachance (1999) studied coping patterns in caregivers of 
institutionalized elders, while Kammer (1994) studied stress and coping in individuals 
who placed an older adult in a nursing home. Several researchers conducted studies 
regarding children and their families in coping with illness and disease (Azar & Solomon, 
2001; Hanton, 1998; Heaman, 1995; Yeh, 2001).  I found no studies to date that related to 
perioperative nursing and the cognitive theory of psychological stress and coping. 
 Nursing Research and Patient Safety 
 The emergence of nursing research into improving patient safety has caught the 
attention of mainstream media (“Heavy Nurse Workload,” 2002; “Dying for Lack,” 
2002). Investigating how certain variables, such as understaffing of registered nurses, 
affects patient outcomes has begun a body of knowledge specific to the nursing domain. 
Aiken, Clarke, Sloane, Sochalski, and Silber (2002) found that high nurse-to-patient 
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ratios affect surgical patient complications, nurse burnout, and job satisfaction. Results 
indicated that nurses who experienced higher nurse-to-patient ratios developed earlier 
burnout and dissatisfaction with the profession.  
 In addition, patient mortality and failure to rescue increased as nurses assumed a 
higher patient workload. Needleman, Buerhaus, Mattke, Stewart, and Zelevinsky (2002) 
found significant relationships among increases in urinary tract infections and proportion 
of RN hours (p = .04), and failure to rescue and number of RN hours per patient day (p = 
.008). Nurse-patient staffing ratios has become a primary focus of AORN, and one of its 
2004 legislative priorities is to keep the RN in the operating room by focusing on state 
and federal laws that would require an RN in the circulator role (Beu, 2004). 
 In considering the educational preparation of the registered nurse, Aiken, Clarke, 
Cheung, Sloane, and Siber (2003) found that surgical patients had less serious 
complications and lower mortality rates when nurses were educated at the baccalaureate 
level or higher. These findings stood in contrast to current beliefs that years of experience 
are a more substantive predictor than type of educational preparation. The focus of the 
IOM’s third report on patient safety was on variables in nurse work environments that 
may contribute or hinder safety initiatives (Page, 2004). 
Coping and Nursing 
 Studies on coping and nursing, using the model of Lazarus and Folkman, 
surround a variety of variables and contexts. Hendel, Fish, and Aboudi (2000) explored 
nurses’ coping strategies during a national crisis, and found that nurses coped primarily 
through direct action problem-focused strategies because they were unable to remove the 
environmental stressor. Managers used informational and emotion-focused coping 
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strategies such as social support in an effort to buffer the impact of the experience. 
Hertting, Nilsson, Theorell, and Larsson (2004) found social support to be a primary 
emotion-focused strategy of coping in a study of registered nurses’ stress and coping 
against the backdrop of corporate restructuring. Santos et al. (2003) compared coping 
skills among baby boomer nurses, older registered nurses, and Generation Xers. Baby 
boomer nurses did not cope as well as the other groups in terms of self-care and social 
support. Lee (2003) found that direct-action types of coping strategies, such as being 
organized, and emotion-coping strategies, specifically escape-avoidance, were most 
commonly used by nurses. 
Coping and Perioperative Nursing  
 No studies to date situated in the perioperative setting have been found to address 
coping strategies used by nurses in the event of an error. McGarvy, Chambers, and Boore 
(2004) found that perioperative nurses use a coping strategy termed role distance as a 
way to manage role strain. The researchers suggested that although role expectations of 
perioperative nurses involve interactions with patients, administrators, and surgeons, 
nurses tended to distance themselves if the responsibility became too burdensome. In a 
study on coping strategies of perioperative nurses and organ procurement procedures, 
Carter-Gentry and McCurren (2004) found major themes in coping with the procurement 
process throughout all three phases of the surgical experience. During the preoperative 
phase, nurses stayed focused on doing their job; this was accomplished by “numbing” 
themselves to the experience. Nurses used specific strategies of detachment and 
desensitization during the intraoperative phase. In all three phases, nurses used distancing 
and escape-avoidance forms of coping.   
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 Cook, Green, and Topp (2001) identified coping strategies practiced by 
perioperative nurses during incidents of verbal abuse by physicians. Participants used the 
process of cognitive appraisal after the encounter of verbal abuse. Many responses 
revolved around the nurses feeling that they did nothing wrong and did not deserve the 
abusive treatment. After appraisal, adaptive problem- and emotion-focused behaviors 
were used frequently during abusive encounters. Several strategies were constructive, 
such as planful problem-solving and seeking social support. 
 The theory of psychological stress and coping is rooted in the transactional 
relationship between individuals and their environments. Individuals determine if a 
particular event, occurring within the relationship, is a form of stress and to what extent it 
becomes harmful to their well-being. Cognitive appraisal of the event and the subsequent 
adaptational outcome continue the process. Coping strategies may be problem-focused or 
emotion-focused interventions whereby individuals seek to remedy the impact on their 
physical and mental health (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985b). In this study, how perioperative 
nurses appraise and react to the stress of committing an error was explored. Which 
coping strategies used by perioperative nurses determined what type of practice changes 
occurred as well as the extent of emotional distress involved in the process.   
Perioperative Nursing Error 
 Perioperative nursing error has been peripherally linked to patient safety research.  
Reavis, Sandidge, and Bauer (1998) studied the role of critical thinking in reducing 
patient injury. Findings indicated that behaviors reflective of critical thinking were 
primarily categorized as being important for patient safety. Data collection procedures 
consisted of participant observations and interviews. Findings of another study 
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demonstrated that perioperative nurses frequently used safety specific nursing diagnosis 
and interventions in caring for surgical patients (Killen, Kleinbeck, Golar, Schuchardt, & 
Uebele, 1997). Nursing diagnoses such as risk for infection and risk for perioperative 
injury were considered critical for positive patient outcomes. Communication has been 
identified as an important variable in patient safety and nursing error. The perioperative 
team consists of physicians, nurses, technologists, and ancillary personnel; therefore, 
communication is vital for successful patient outcomes. According to JCAHO, nearly 
80% of wrong site surgery sentinel events between 1995 and 2003 occurred because of 
communication problems (JCAHO, n.d.). Bates and Gawande (2003) reported that 
improved communication through the use of information technology is one type of 
strategy that can assist in preventing errors and adverse events.   
 Communication failures were found to compromise patient safety (Lingard et al., 
2004) by causing interruptions in routine and increasing tension among the team 
members.  Silén-Lipponen, Tossavainen, Turunen, and Smith (2005) interviewed British, 
Finnish, and American nurses on topics related to sources of intraoperative nursing errors 
and prevention strategies. Results indicated that effective teamwork was the pervading 
theme and encompassed the main categories of shared teamwork responsibility, 
demanding teamwork practice, and organized teamwork. Inexperienced nurses, staff 
turnover, and the emotional distress associated with the operating room environment 
were identified as sources of potential error. Ways to reduce errors included maintaining 
competency, fostering cohesive teamwork, sharing responsibility for actions, and feeling 
supported by management. 
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C. Approaches to Error Management 
Although the focus has been on error management after the fact, healthcare 
facilities are becoming more proactive in designing safe patient environments that may 
prevent error before it occurs. Through application of Reason’s Organizational Accident 
Model (2000), methods of handling errors are supported through either a person-centered 
or system approach. Meurier (2000) stated that Reason undertook the etiology of accident 
causation and sought to focus on organizational factors as opposed to the individual who 
makes the error. Using the model in addressing errors has led to what Wears and Leape 
(1999) referred to as the “new look” in error management. This look is in contrast to the 
traditional methods of error analysis, which utilize criteria of personal responsibility and 
accountability while de-emphasizing the role of the system.  
Ebright, Patterson, and Render (2002) described how a clinical nurse specialist 
(CNS) could incorporate the new look into practice. Four areas assisting in the transition 
include promoting a non-punitive culture, understanding systems, learning about 
resiliency in healthcare workers, and anticipating the complex nature of change. A 
systems approach to error management involves looking at internal and external 
influences that impact the organization’s structural and functional ways of operation 
(Benner, Sheets, Uris, Malloch, Schwed, & Jamison,2002).   
Studies have identified that accidents occur in complex systems by way of 
multiple small factors as opposed to one main reason or root cause (Leape et al., 1995; 
Vincent, 2003). The model has been used in other areas including nursing curriculum. 
Faculty members at Thomas Jefferson University applied systems analysis as an 
operational approach to teaching medication administration to first-semester 
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baccalaureate nursing students (Papastrat & Wallace, 2003). This approach was intended 
to foster a safe, open climate regarding medication errors while assisting students to 
differentiate between the responsibility and accountability of the individual professional 
nurse versus the system itself. Reason (1990) classified types or errors according to three 
levels. Slips and lapses refer to those acts in which an individual performs a psychomotor 
skill without conscious control, for example, donning sterile gloves. Rule-based and 
knowledge-based mistakes require conscious response by an individual after a problem 
has been detected, for example, contaminating the sterile gloves. Reason (1990) stated, 
“skill-based slips generally precede the detection of a problem, while rule-based and 
knowledge-based mistakes arise during subsequent attempts to find a solution” (p. 56). 
The nature and context of error, mechanisms controlling human performance, and the 
nature of the individual are three factors that must be understood in the formulation of 
error.   
In the context of complex systems and accident causation, Reason (1990) 
correlated the basic elements of production systems with the human elements of accident 
causation. Reason also made a clear distinction between two types of errors. Active errors 
are those committed on the sharp end of intentional, front-line action, while latent errors 
are embedded in the system and lie dormant until a string of events propels them to the 
surface. The trajectory of an accident develops from the breakdown of complex systems. 
From a healthcare perspective, active failures are those actions by practitioners on the 
sharp end of the system, such as nurses and physicians. Latent failures at the indirect end 
of the system are committed by persons not involved in direct patient care. The etiology 
of the failure begins at the latent end where faulty decisions are made. Complex systems 
           
 28 
    
   
are built upon a series of defenses aimed at ensuring smooth, safe operations. For an 
accident or error to occur, each level of defense must be breached starting at the latent 
end of causation. All windows of opportunity must be in alignment for the accident or 
failure to reach the active end.   
 Gawande, Studdert, Orav, Brennan, and Zinner (2003) found that there was a 
greater risk of leaving foreign bodies behind after emergency surgery, unplanned changes 
in the surgical procedure, and patients with higher body-mass index. The researchers 
sought to identify human and system-related risk factors that contributed to surgical 
errors because previous studies had normally focused only on frequency and outcomes.    
Leape et al. (1995) found 16 major system failures that contributed to medication errors. 
Of those 16, the most common failures were drug knowledge dissemination (29%), dose 
and identity checking (40%), and patient information availability (37%).   
Cook, Hoas, Guttmannova, and Joyner (2004) found that 46% of respondents 
participating in a multimethod study on definitions and approaches to solving patient 
safety issues disagreed strongly with the belief that mistakes often are the fault of one 
person instead of a faulty system. The study also suggested that healthcare providers 
adopt a conceptual framework constructed upon the belief that all team members share 
responsibility for safety in order to approach safety issues from a systems perspective.  
What needs to be conveyed and felt by the team is a sense of collective responsibility 
because placing the blame strictly on the individual is a deterrent approach to improving 
safety (Leape, 1998).   
 The person approach is the traditional method of looking for one answer as to 
why error occurs, thus limiting the investigation of error to one cause, that being the 
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individual responsible for committing the error. Error causation is very complex and 
involves more than one person’s action (Pape, 2001). A focus on the exact point of 
contact between the individual and the actual error disconnects it from the system and 
prevents a more expanded investigation into finding the numerous factors that contribute 
to error. The traditional method is associated with blame, punishment, and fear, and is 
dominant in the health care system. Because disclosure of the error is essential in 
dissecting the causes, establishing a non-punitive culture enables individuals to be more 
forthright in reporting errors but does not relieve them of responsibility. Parker and 
Lawton (2003) proposed there is a tendency in healthcare to conclude that individual 
incompetence is at the core of an error, and focusing on the individual provides 
supervisory personnel a way to blame and weed out what they believe to be an accident-
prone individual. Contrary to the systems approach, emphasis is placed on who made the 
error and what shortcomings on the part of the individual led him or her to commit the 
error.   
Presently, state boards of nursing continue to utilize this approach by conducting 
disciplinary investigations on nurses reported to the board for breaches in standards of 
care (Benner et al., 2002). In two published stories, the Massachusetts Board of 
Registration in Nursing decided to take action against 18 nurses involved in 
chemotherapy overdoses at Dana-Farber Cancer Institute (Beardsley, 1999). The 
Colorado Board of Registration in Nursing disciplined two nurses after a medication error 
resulted in the death of an infant (Plum, 1997). Board decisions of this type could impact 
error reporting and perpetuate a blame culture.   
           
 30 
    
   
Although the person approach is utilized throughout the health care system, there 
is little support in the literature for this method. According to Connor, Ponte, and 
Conway (2002), a focus on systems approach as it relates to error causation does not 
dismiss individual accountability. An opinion piece by Hall (2002) stated that “systems 
don’t make errors, people do” (p. 5).   
In a study on how nurses’ self esteem was affected after being disciplined for a 
medication error, Arndt (1994b) found that nurses were labeled as having a lack of 
knowledge about the medication while discounting other causes such as heavy workload, 
illness, or personal problems. This qualitative study focused on the practitioner’s 
perception of the experience, as well as projected decisions and imagined actions 
conducted after the error occurred. According to Leape and Berwick (2000), errors are 
not primarily due to a lack of knowledge but an interweaving of numerous factors.   
Aside from the system and person approaches, a third variable, practice 
responsibility, may be considered an integral part of error occurrence. The nursing 
profession has its own set of professional and ethical standards to guide practice. Under 
provision four of the American Nurses’ Association (ANA) Code of Ethics with 
Interpretive Statements, accountability and responsibility in practice are framed within a 
code of ethical conduct directed by the moral principles of fidelity and respect for the 
self-determination, worth, and dignity of all patients (ANA, n.d.). It is suggested that the 
ANA Code of Ethics is formulated upon a deontologic theory of ethics, whereby the 
nurse has a moral duty to uphold the code of the profession in all circumstances (Kelley, 
2002). The duties, as outlined in the code, are upheld regardless of consequence with an 
emphasis on process, not outcome. A codified set of rights or wrongs defines duty of 
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care, and a breach in the duty resulting in patient harm has potential for claims of 
negligence in civil courts (Hughes, 2002).  
  Other theories emphasize ethical decision-making based upon the nurse-patient 
relationship as grounded in context and agreement (Husted & Husted, 2002). A nurse is 
viewed as a moral agent, orienting to each new relationship and defining ethical care 
through interactions with others. Self motivation, a sincere notion of good, and an 
inherent moral sense lead the nurse toward appropriate ethical decision-making if the 
patient’s well being is compromised (Benner, Hooper-Kyriakidis, & Stannard, 1999).  
Errors may be decreased if nurses use critical thinking, professional standards guidance, 
and purposeful thought (Bennett & Dune, 2002).   
 A decision whether or not to report an error is inexplicably linked to how others 
view a nurse’s moral sense of duty. According to Hall (2003), a new way of thinking has 
emerged in healthcare. Practitioners are now expected to report their errors to patients. 
Practicing veracity constitutes faithfulness to the patient. However, barriers to error 
reporting should be addressed if error reporting is a major factor in error management. 
The seriousness of the error, fear of disciplinary action, civil and criminal lawsuits, 
damaged reputation, and loss of confidence are reasons why nurses decide not to report 
errors (Wolf, Serembus, Smetzer, Cohen, & Cohen, 2000). Organizations accredited by 
JCAHO are encouraged to report sentinel events that meet certain criteria (JCAHO, 
2005). The state of Florida has a statute requiring licensed health-care facilities to inform 
patients who have incurred serious harm from an adverse event (State of Florida, n.d.). 
In a study on underreporting of medication administration errors committed by 
nurses, Wakefield, Wakefield, Uden-Holman, Borders, Blegen, and Vaughnet (1999) 
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identified 15 potential barriers to reporting. After factor analysis, the barriers combined 
into four subscales: (a) disagreement over error, (b) reporting effort, (c) fear, and (d) 
administrative response. Gladstone (1995) identified themes from comments made by 
nurses regarding error reporting, including hesitancy to report errors due to worry and 
fear of reaction by management staff. Osborne et al. (1999) found that 86% of nurses 
believed that medications errors were not reported due to fear. Rogers, Hwang, and Scott 
(2004) studied the relationship of break habits and nursing errors of hospital-based staff 
registered nurses for a period of 28 days. One of the notable findings indicated that 30% 
of the nurses self-reported committing errors, primarily medication, during the 28-day 
period. The authors did not indicate whether or not the errors were reported to 
management staff. Taylor et al. (2004) found that being uncertain about what is 
considered an error and concerns about implicating others were primary reasons cited by 
nurses and physicians for not reporting errors. 
Perioperative nurses may not report errors for some of the same reasons but 
feelings of anonymity sensed by the nurses adds a distinct variable that sets perioperative 
nursing apart from other specialties. It is readily apparent that healthcare facilities should 
encourage an environment that supports nurses in the event of an error.  
Practitioners have a responsibility to learn from their experiences and share these 
experiences with other nurses. The culture, however, must be one in which nurses feel 
supported and can share their experience that may have led to a negative patient outcome.  
Experiential learning in a practice discipline contributes to its research agenda and is 
unlike a culture that attributes error solely to individual responsibility (Woods & Doan-
Johnson, 2002). As nurses build upon their experiences through knowledge and practice, 
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they contribute evidence as a result of progressive, collective learning. The evidence 
translates into best practices for nursing.  
Benner (personal communication, April 16, 2003) proposed that practice 
responsibility requires agency, vigilance, and an internal notion of what is good for the 
patient. Benner et al. (2002) analyzed nursing errors that individuals reported to state 
boards of nursing. In addition to system and individual approaches, it was proposed that 
socially rooted shared nursing practices bear some responsibility for nursing error.  
Practice responsibility was derived from education, nurse practice acts, professional 
associations, regulatory agencies, and healthcare institutions. Goals for the study included 
development of a taxonomy of errors with future strategies aimed at error prevention. A 
major result from the study was the development of a taxonomy of nursing error survey 
instrument which classifies errors according to cause, patient outcome, and disciplinary 
action. The instrument provides a systematic way of coding types of error based upon 
each individual case. In the future the compiled data will be useful in minimizing and 
preventing errors. Meurier, Vincent, and Parmar (1997) found nurses who take 
responsibility for their error tend to make constructive changes in practice. 
Practice responsibility in perioperative nursing involves interventions aimed 
toward keeping the patient safe from injury. Advocacy is a main tenet of perioperative 
practice responsibility, in part due to the vulnerable nature of the surgical patient. The 
scope of perioperative nursing interventions includes education, collaboration, 
coordination, management, support, and advocacy (AORN, 2001). Seifert (2002) stated 
that reporting error is part of the nurse’s role as moral agent and patient advocate. 
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According to Schroeter (1999), perioperative nurses both perceive and identify certain 
ethical issues bound to practice responsibility.     
D.  Definitions of Error 
 While many private and public organizations such as JCAHO, IOM, AHRQ, and 
AMA define errors within the context of the medical domain, errors specifically 
addressing the domain of nursing, especially perioperative clinical practice, have not 
been clearly identified. Research related to type, definition, or taxonomy of error has 
been medical in nature (Dovey et al., 2002). Dunn (2003) stated that medical errors are 
often classified according to diagnosis, treatment, preventive, and miscellaneous. 
Additional classifications include four phases of medical decision making such as data 
gathering, integration or processing of data, confirmation of diagnosis, and treatment 
(Goldberg, Kuhn, Andrew, & Thomas 2002).   
 In regard to intraoperative errors, classifications tend to be generalized according 
to type of error and non-specific as to the process of how the error occurs and what or 
who is responsible for the event. For example, the National Quality Forum (NQF) 
considers death or serious injury from electrical shock, burns, falls, or hemolytic reaction 
from incompatible blood as one of its “never” events which it considers a preventable act 
(Pugliese & Bartley, 2004). The Institute for Health Care Improvement (IHI) lists the 
following goals for improving safety in the operating room: (a) reducing intraoperative 
injuries and complications by 50%; (b) decreasing the incidence of medication errors in 
the OR and postanesthesia care unit by 30%; (c) reducing equipment failures and 
equipment-use errors by 50%; and (d) eliminating wrong-patient surgery, wrong-site 
surgery, and use of incompatible blood products (Pugliese & Bartley, 2004). The 
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challenge is to define which perioperative nursing errors result in the above documented 
negative patient outcomes. 
E. Gaps in the Literature 
 The existing literature revealed a significant gap in research on nursing errors, 
especially in perioperative nursing, offering only a small glimpse into this world. Surgical 
errors are often defined in the context of medicine; therefore, there was little information 
on how perioperative nurses define errors within their locus of control. Research on the 
context, including circumstances surrounding errors and causes of error, needs to be 
conducted. Gaps exist on how perioperative nurses cope with committing an error, 
whether or not practice changes result, and if there is emotional distress involved in the 
experience. No studies were found that used perioperative nurses as a population of study 
using the conceptual framework of Lazarus and Folkman’s theory of cognitive 
psychological stress and coping.  
 Gaps in the literature may be due in part to errors in the operating room being 
dealt with internally due to its physical and cultural isolation from other department 
contexts. The physically restricted space of the operating room has literally kept 
perioperative nurses behind closed doors. The operating room culture often is described 
as secretive and different because the physical environment is confined and the staff 
wears specialty clothing and face masks. A feeling of anonymity exists because 
perioperative nurses rarely see their patients after the surgical experience. Depending 
upon the type of surgery, perioperative nurses may care for as few as one patient to 
several in one shift. Completing the operating room case schedule on time entails smooth, 
efficient room turnover time, leaving limited time for perioperative nurses to interact with 
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their patients. It seems apparent that perioperative nurses must be given a voice and be 
recognized in their practice specialty. 
F. Summary 
 Research specific to the perioperative context has focused on a variety of topics.  
Physiological and psychological safety of patients has related to those variables that may 
lead to negative patient outcomes. Research on operating room errors have centered on 
physiological outcomes attributed to physician error such as wrong site, wrong side 
surgery, and retained foreign objects. In the general nursing domain, emphasis on patient 
safety issues such as medication errors, post-operative complications, and failure to 
rescue has dominated the literature.  
 A large amount of the literature has revealed several studies on identifying the 
system inadequacies involved in medical errors. Shifting the culture from a punitive one 
to one of safety and trust has been slow as health care professionals move toward feeling 
comfortable in reporting errors without fear of repercussions. Recognizing that humans 
make mistakes requires a paradigmatic shift. 
 Literature on the concepts of stress and coping has generated a wealth of 
information on how healthcare workers deal with the innate stress familiar to the many 
professionals practicing in various healthcare disciplines. With the current shortage of 
registered nurses, research should continue in the areas of assisting nurses to recognize 
and work through stressful encounters common in the profession. Repeated encounters 
with stressful events without the necessary tools to amend the experience leads to early 
burnout and dissatisfaction.   
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 This study sought to provide information on definitions, circumstances, and 
causes of intraoperative nursing error from the perioperative nurse’s own perspective.  
Additional gaps in the literature suggest a need to determine future interventions designed 
to limit the emotional impact of committing an error and discover which coping strategies 
lead to constructive and defensive changes in practice. Although demographic data on 
perioperative nurses exists, no studies have been reported that correlated the variables of 
age, gender, marital status, race, level of education, job position, and certification with 
intraoperative nursing errors
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III. METHODS 
 
 
A.  Research Design 
 
The research design for this study was a descriptive, correlational design using a 
survey to obtain information. Survey research has the advantage of being flexible, broad, 
and available to a large number of participants (Polit & Hungler, 2002).   
B.  Setting 
The participants chose the setting for this study because the method of data 
collection was a self-administered questionnaire. One questionnaire was mailed to each 
participant. 
C. Sample 
 The sample for this study was a randomized selection of perioperative registered 
nurses who are members of AORN. No other criteria were used for inclusion in the study. 
Students and associate members of AORN were excluded. A sample size of 180 achieved 
a 93% power to detect an r2 of 10% attributed to six independent variables using an F-test 
with an alpha of 0.05. Power analysis was carried out using PASS 2004. Assuming a 
response rate of 27%, a total of 700 surveys were mailed. Members of AORN pay annual 
dues for membership and their membership records are part of a nationwide database. 
Permission to access the database was given by AORN (see Appendix B). Recruitment 
was facilitated through several mailings including an advance notice letter and follow-up
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postcard. In addition, an announcement was made in the national newsletter, AORN 
Connections, to inform AORN members of the study (see Appendix C). 
D.  Measures 
I used a demographic tool to collect data to describe the sample. These data 
included age, gender, race, marital status, level of education, and certification was 
ascertained (see Appendix D). 
The major instrument used to answer the research questions in this study was the 
Perioperative Nurse Questionnaire (see Appendix E). I developed this version from two 
previous questionnaires used in studies on errors. Definitions, circumstances, and causes 
of intraoperative nursing error were measured. In addition, operating room atmosphere, 
interaction with management, institutional response, nurses’ reactions to committing an 
error as defined by emotional distress, coping strategies used when confronted with an 
error, and what changes in practice occur post-error were measured. A shortened version 
of Folkman and Lazarus’s (1985) Ways of Coping, included within the questionnaire, 
measured coping strategies. The Ways of Coping scale included six of the original eight 
scales representing emotion-focused and problem-focused forms of coping. The two 
coping strategy scales, positive reappraisal and confrontive, were not included in this 
study because the items for each scale did not appear related to error (Wu et al., 1991). 
The six scales were as follows: 
1. Distancing (represented by three items) 
2. Accepting responsibility (represented by three items) 
3. Seeking social support (represented by three items) 
4. Planful problem solving (representing two items) 
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5. Escape-avoidance (representing two items) 
6. Self-controlling (representing three items) 
In this study, stress referred to the actual occurrence of committing an error. 
Coping entailed the cognitive appraisal and coping strategies used by perioperative 
nurses in handling the aftermath. Defensive and constructive changes in practice and 
emotional distress were the adaptational outcomes resulting from the nurse’s perception 
and management of the experience. In multiple regression analysis, the major predictor 
independent variables were the coping strategies, and changes in practice and emotional 
distress were the dependent variables.  
The original questionnaire, What Do We Learn From Our Mistakes?, was 
developed to measure how physicians handle mistakes and identify what factors 
contribute to learning from the mistakes (Wu et al., 1991). Meurier et al., (1997) 
modified the original questionnaire in their study on British staff ward nurses. The 
authors reported how nurses learn from their errors and what, if any, changes in practice 
occurred. Efforts were made to remodel the tool to reflect nursing context and items 
related to medical practice were removed. Permission to use the entire instrument was 
provided by the originator of the questionnaire, What Do We Learn From Our Mistakes? 
(see Appendix F), as well as Meurier’s revised version titled, Inappropriate Nursing 
Decisions and Actions (see Appendix G). The Ways of Coping instrument is in the public 
domain and no permission was needed by the originator of the tool (see Appendix H).   
 The Perioperative Nurse Questionnaire used in this study was formally known in 
a pilot study as Nursing Decisions and Actions (Meurier et al., 1997). I modified the 
questionnaire to reflect the population of perioperative registered nurses. The name of the 
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questionnaire was changed after I conducted the pilot study because I thought it would be 
more attractive to potential participants. It was a 29-item questionnaire measured on a 4-
point Likert scale. In addition to demographic data, the questionnaire was constructed 
according to the following main categories: (a) definitions, (b) circumstances, (c) causes, 
(d) emotional distress, (e) coping, and (f) changes in practice. In this study, reactions 
were defined as emotional distress. The questionnaire began with a short paragraph 
regarding its intent, followed by a general definition of nursing error and close call. The 
researcher sought to answer the research questions posed in the study through analysis of 
the data provided in the questionnaire.  
 The Perioperative Nurse Questionnaire was limited in its ability to adequately 
measure the variables under study. Black (1999) stated that an action is the focus of 
attention in measuring attitudes, views, and perceptions as opposed to a written response. 
Self-reports ask the individual to use retrospective recall which calls into question the 
accuracy of remembering specific thoughts and behaviors (Folkman & Moskowitz 2004). 
Content Validity  
Because previous studies using the questionnaire focused on different 
populations, I modified the tool to be more reflective of the context of errors in the 
intraoperative environment. To establish content validity pertaining to those specific 
items addressing the intraoperative environment, I recruited a panel of six perioperative 
experts to conduct a content validity analysis (see Appendix I). In addition, the experts 
were encouraged to make further recommendations on the remaining items excluding the 
coping scale. I provided a content validity index (CVI) to each panel expert. The index 
was constructed in a 4-point Likert scale format with 1 equating to not relevant to 4 being 
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very relevant (see Appendix J). The final CVI score for the total instrument was the 
percentage of total items rated by the panel as either a 3 or 4. A score of .80 was 
recognized as having good content validity (Polit & Hungler, 2002).   
All items related to definitions and causes of intraoperative nursing error that 
received a score of .80 or above were included in the tool for the pilot study. One item 
relating to definition of error with a score of .50 and one item relating to causes of error 
with a score of .66 were included after editing recommendations by the panel.   
Reliability 
Since no reliability data were available, I conducted a pilot study to establish 
reliability of the questionnaire, Nursing Decisions and Actions, by assessing its stability 
using a test-retest method. A test-retest method is considered a measure of reliability and 
the tool is administered to the same group on two separate occasions (Black, 1999).  
After receiving Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval from Duquesne University 
(see Appendix K), I selected a randomized sample of 100 members from the South 
Florida Chapter of AORN with a total membership at the time of 240 members. The 
president of the chapter gave permission to use the sample. Of the 100 surveys in the first 
mailing, 21 were returned with one survey missing a code and one returned due to an 
incorrect address. The second mailing was done approximately 2 weeks later and 10 
surveys were returned with 1 survey being returned that didn’t match with the first 
survey. The total of matched surveys was nine. Ten surveys were ineligible due to the 
absence of a matched retest.   
Because of the limited response, a second mailing was done using an additional 
random sample of 100 from the same database as above. One survey was returned due to 
43 
    
    
an incorrect address. An initial response on the first mailing was promising with 25 
returns but only 13 second-mailing surveys were matched with the first mailing. The total 
sample for the pilot study was 22. Possible reasons for the low response rate was 
conducting the mailing during the summer months when people normally take vacation, 
the cover letter being unclear as to the directions for test-retest, and the threat of a 
hurricane during the mailing of the second sample. 
Correlation coefficients using Spearman rank correlation coefficient
 
(rs) were 
conducted on all items in the survey using the statistical software package, SPSS 12.0.  
The Spearman
 
rank correlation coefficient
 
is a non-parametric test that may be used when 
variable pairs are measured on an ordinal scale (Black, 1999). Coefficients ranged from 
.29 to .97.  
Categories 
 Correlation coefficients for definitions of error ranged from .29 to .69. The items 
having low scores remained in the questionnaire due to the nature of the question, the 
small sample, and the score assigned on the content validity index. Presently, no data 
exist on how perioperative nurses define types of intraoperative nursing errors. Table 1 
represents Spearman rank correlation coefficient values for definitions of error measured 
in the pilot study. 
 Correlation coefficients for circumstances surrounding the error such as years of 
perioperative nursing experience, age of the patient, type of surgical procedure, patient 
overall level of functioning, timing of the error, and patient outcome ranged from .91 to 
.97.  Causes of the error were measured by two questions containing several items each, 
and coefficient values ranged from .70 to .93.  
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Table 1 
 
Definitions of Error (N=22) 
 
 
Definitions of error 
 
 
rs 
 
Was unclear about surgical site 
 
.69* 
 
Improperly placed ESU pad 
 
.68** 
 
Improper patient positioning 
 
.60** 
 
Miscalculated dose/strength of medication 
 
.66** 
 
Inaccurate, incomplete, or absent surgical count 
 
.37 
 
Break in sterile technique 
 
.62** 
 
Retained foreign object 
 
.48* 
 
Equipment misuse related to lack of knowledge 
 
.43* 
 
Lack of appropriate equipment 
 
.62* 
 
Blood or blood product transfusion reaction 
 
.47* 
 
Incorrect surgical prep 
 
.29 
 
Was unaware of patient allergy 
 
.46* 
 
Misidentified a patient 
 
.56* 
Note. Responses were made on 4-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 
4 = agree strongly). 
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
 
 Coefficient values for the operating room atmosphere defined as a cause of error 
ranged from .78 to .87. Because I was treading new ground in studying intraoperative 
nursing errors, I decided to keep all of the items including the ones with low coefficient 
values. Reactions to error represented emotional distress and coefficient values ranged 
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from .86 to .98. Coping with the error was represented by 16 items grouped into six 
scales. Coefficient results ranged from .81 to .94. Coefficient values ranged from .84 to 
.93 representing institutional response and how participants felt after discussion with 
management staff. Correlation coefficient ranges related to changes in practice were .81 
to .93.   
Tool Revisions 
 Several revisions were made to the questionnaire after the pilot study.  The title 
was changed to alert participants that its content was specific to perioperative practice. A 
definition of “close call” was added because the participant is asked a question directly 
related to the term.  Question 4 was narrative in nature and asked participants to 
remember a time when they committed an error in the care of a patient during the 
intraoperative period. The question was deleted for this study. 
 The Likert scale categories were revised to better represent the items. For 
example, strongly disagree was changed to disagree strongly in order to maintain 
uniformity throughout the questionnaire. For the question related to coping strategies, the 
scale was changed from strongly disagree, disagree somewhat, agree somewhat, and 
agree strongly to not used, used, used quite a bit, and used a great deal. The revised 
format was in line with the previous studies utilizing the coping strategies identified by 
Folkman and Lazarus. Two items were added to question 20 regarding institutional 
response. Other changes were grammatical in nature for clarification on certain items and 
to decrease the amount of missing data during analysis. Directions in the questionnaire 
related to the pilot study were deleted.  
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E. Procedures for Data Collection 
 Salant and Dillman (1994) recommended at least four separate mailings for a 
basic questionnaire. However, to assure anonymity, I used three mailings for this study. 
The first mailing was a short, personalized, advance-notice letter, informing AORN 
members that they were selected to participate in a study and would be receiving a 
questionnaire on perioperative nursing errors (see Appendix L).  Approximately 1 week 
later, I made a second contact. The second mailing included a personalized cover letter 
(see Appendix M), the questionnaire, and a self-addressed return stamped envelope. I 
sent a third mail-out in the form of a follow-up postcard to all potential participants 
approximately 1 week after mailing of the second mail-out (see Appendix N). The entire 
data collection period was estimated to be 3-4 weeks. All data collection procedures were 
conducted to enhance the response rate. If the rate of response had been low, I would 
have sent a second round of mailings from the same AORN database to a new 
randomized sample excluding the first sample. 
F.  Procedures for Protection of Human Subjects 
 I sought approval for the protocol from the Duquesne University Institutional 
Review Board. Because the study dealt with sensitive subject matter, every effort was 
made to maintain strict confidentiality and anonymity of the participants. The participants 
were informed that by answering and returning the questionnaire, they were giving 
consent to participate. Participation was totally voluntary and there were no consequences 
for non-participation. There were no anticipated risks to participation and benefits 
included dissemination of findings to the larger health care audience. There was no 
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compensation for participation; however, participation in the project involved no 
monetary cost to the participants.  
Confidentiality and Anonymity 
 No names appeared on the questionnaire and no identities were revealed in the 
data analysis. There were no identifying characteristics on the tool that allowed me to 
identify any of the participants. I stored all written materials in a locked file in my home. 
I reported only in statistical summaries to insure that participants and their employers 
were not identified. To further ensure confidentiality and anonymity, I instructed 
participants to not place a return address on the self-addressed stamped envelope being 
sent to me, and not place their names, names of any other persons or health care facilities, 
or any other identifying information anywhere on the document. These instructions were 
provided in the second mailing.   
 If any identifying characteristics appeared on the questionnaire or return 
envelope, the materials were shredded and discarded. Participants were instructed in the 
questionnaire that if they placed their name or return address on the envelope or any other 
identifying characteristics on the questionnaire, the data would not be used. If any 
participants contacted me after the study to discuss their experience with committing an 
error, I would have informed them that I was unable to speak with them in order to 
maintain confidentially and anonymity. I was not contacted by any of the participants. 
G. Procedures for Data Analysis 
Preliminary Analysis of Data 
 I used descriptive statistics including means, standard deviations, frequencies, and 
percentages to summarize data for all participants on definitions and frequencies of error 
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and the categorical, independent sociodemographic variables of age, gender, race, marital 
status, level of education, job category, and certification. I constructed frequency 
distributions of values for each variable and examined them to check the accuracy and 
consistency of the data. I generated histograms for each major variable to assess whether 
or not the data was normally distributed.  
 In addition, I reported descriptive statistics on the categorical independent 
variables representing the circumstances of error for those participants who answer yes to 
question 4, Have you committed an intraoperative nursing error? I analyzed the 
continuous independent variables in the questionnaire, including causes of error, 
operating room atmosphere, coping strategies, interaction with management, and 
institutional response, using descriptive statistics. I produced histograms to depict visual 
differences in the variables and assess normal distribution of data. I examined 
consistency and accuracy of the data through frequency distributions. I reported 
descriptive statistics on research questions 1 through 5.  
 I grouped the items relating to the continuous independent variables into 
subscales. The subscales represented causes of error, types of coping strategies, and 
institutional response. For this study, causes of error were represented by four subscales: 
(a) inexperience, identified by six items; (b) lack of supervision, identified by six items; 
(c) job overload, identified by four items; and (d) faulty judgment, identified by seven 
items. 
 I measured the coping strategies were by 16 items. A shortened version of Ways 
of Coping by Folkman and Lazarus (1984) measured coping strategies and were 
represented by six scales: (a) accepting responsibility, identified by three items; (b) 
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seeking social support, identified by three items; (c) self-control, identified by three 
items; (d) escape-avoidance, identified by two items; (e) planful problem solving, 
identified by two items; and (f) distancing, identified by three items. I identified 
institutional response by two subscales: (a) judgmental, identified by six items; and (b) 
supportive, identified by three items.  
 I grouped the dependent variables of changes in practice into the subscales of  
constructive and defensive changes. Constructive changes were represented by nine items 
and defensive changes by six items. I used Cronbach’s alpha to analyze the continuous 
independent variables of causes of error, operating room atmosphere, coping strategies, 
and institutional response, and the dependent variables of emotional distress in response 
to the error, and changes in practice for internal consistency. 
Analysis of Data 
 I calculated Pearson’s product moment correlation (r) to determine if a 
relationship existed between the dependent variables changes in practice and emotional 
distress, and the independent variable subscales representing causes of error, types of 
coping strategies, and managerial response. Key assumptions of correlation coefficients 
were as follows: (a) the correlation coefficient (r) is only applicable as a measure of the 
degree of relationship between linearly-related variables and (b) variables must be 
measured on either an interval or ratio scale (Kachigan, 1991). I constructed scatter 
diagrams to illustrate the relationships between the dependent and continuous 
independent variables. I calculated correlations on research questions 2 through 7. 
 After controlling for the independent variables, I used multiple regression analysis 
to predict emotional distress and constructive and defensive changes in practice from 
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coping strategy variables. This analysis considered all potential predictors, which when 
combined result in the most predictive power (Polit & Hungler, 2002). The assumptions 
of the regression model were that for each set of values of the predictor variables, the 
criterion variable was normally distributed and had equal variances, and the means of the 
criterion variable distributions fell on the regression line (Kachigan, 1991). I analyzed 
research questions 6 and 7 by multiple regression analysis. 
 I considered the results statistically significant at p  =.05 and I used SPSS 13.0 to 
conduct the statistical data analysis. 
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IV. RESULTS, ANALYSIS, AND DISCUSSION 
The chapter begins with a brief discussion related to the recruitment of subjects. A 
preliminary analysis of the data collected is then presented followed by an overall 
summary of the characteristics of the sample. The results and analyses of the responses to 
each research question follows. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the findings. 
A. Recruitment of the Subjects 
After receiving approval from the Duquesne University Institutional Review 
Board, I procured a randomized sample of 700 registered nurses was from AORN, the 
Association of periOperative Registered Nurses. AORN is an international organization 
with an approximate current membership of 41,000 (AORN, n.d.). The first mailing was 
an introduction letter in which I informed the participants that they would be receiving 
the Perioperative Nurse Questionnaire. I sent the second mailing approximately 1 week 
later and included a cover letter and questionnaire. Lastly, I sent a reminder postcard. A 
total of 272 completed questionnaires were returned resulting in a 39% response rate. 
Only one questionnaire was returned due to non-deliverability. Due to the nature of the 
study, confidentiality and anonymity were strictly enforced so that no link could be made 
between participants’ names and other identifiers and their responses. The data entered 
into SPSS 13.0 were reviewed several times for accuracy and consistency of entry by me 
and the statistical assistant.
   
    
52 
B. Preliminary Analysis 
 In the preliminary analysis, I generated histograms to assess data normality. It is 
assumed in multiple regression analysis that the residuals are distributed normally 
(Marascuilo & Serlin, 1988). I analyzed the standardized residuals of the major 
continuous independent variables related to causes of the error and coping with the error 
for skewness and kurtosis. Examination of univariate indices of skewness and kurtosis 
revealed no skewness greater than an absolute value of 0.45, or kurtosis values greater 
than an absolute value of 0.50. For psychometric purposes, a kurtosis and skewness value 
of +/-1 is considered acceptable (Illinois State University, n.d.).  
 I evaluated the data for the major continuous independent variables for 
multivariate outliers by examining leverage indices for each individual and defining an 
outlier as a leverage score four times greater than the mean leverage (Cook & Weisberg, 
1986). Model-based outliers were evaluated by regressing all dependent variables onto 
the applicable predictor variables and the standardized DfBetas were examined for each 
individual. An influential outlier was defined as any individual with an absolute 
standardized DfBeta greater than 1 for a given coefficient. No outliers were evident.  
 I analyzed the Pearson-product moment correlations (r) for significant 
relationships among the continuous independent variables representing causes of the 
error, coping with the error, and managerial response to the error, and the dependent 
variables of changes in practice and emotional distress. In psychological and/or social 
research, an (r) of .50 to 1.00 or -.50 to -1.00 is considered a large correlation among 
variables (Cohen, 1988). An assumption of Pearson’s r is that there is normal distribution 
of the variables (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).
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 I used scatter plots as an aid to assess the linear relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables. I also used scatter plots to assess the homogeneity 
of variances of the dependent variables. No pattern was observed between the 
standardized residuals versus the standardized predicted values. The assumptions were 
met for each particular statistical test, therefore I conducted multiple regression 
techniques for further data analysis.  
C. Characteristics of the Sample 
 I calculated the means (M), standard deviations (SD), frequencies (f), and 
percentages (P) on the characteristics of the total number of respondents (N = 272). There 
were three nurses who did not record their age resulting in a total sample number of 269. 
Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of the ages of the participants. The minimum 
age was 24 and the maximum age was 70. The mean age was 47 years (SD = 9.65).  
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Figure 1. Age of participants in years. 
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 Table 2 shows the results of the data collected on the demographic variables 
including age, gender, marital status, race/ethnicity, level of education, work position, 
and certification. There were two surveys with missing data for gender, two for marital 
status, three for race/ethnicity, five for work position, three for education, and two for 
certification. Participants were overwhelmingly female at 92% (n = 247). Eighty-nine 
percent (n = 240) were non-Hispanic Whites, 76% (n = 204) were married and 86% (n = 
230) indicated that they worked as perioperative staff nurses. Other positions included 
educator (8%), supervisor (2%), and manager (1%). A bachelor’s degree in nursing 
(BSN) was held by 39% of the participants (n = 104), while 27% (n = 73) held an 
associate degree in nursing, and 20% (n = 53) graduated with a diploma in nursing. The 
remaining educational levels were bachelor’s degree in other field (8%), master’s degree 
in nursing (3%), master’s degree in other field (2%), and doctorate in other field (<1%). 
None of the participants claimed to have a doctorate in nursing. The mean age of this 
sample population is consistent with the national average. However, preliminary data 
published in the 2004 National Sample Survey of Registered Nurses indicated a rising 
trend of nurses educated at the associate degree rather than the baccalaureate degree level 
(United States Department of Health and Human Services, 2004). Specialty certification 
as a nurse in the operating room (CNOR) was held by 52% of the perioperative registered 
nurses. Nationally, there are over 29,000 perioperative registered nurses who hold the 
CNOR title (K. Nahulu, personal communication, April 10, 2006). 
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Table 2 
Frequency Distribution of Demographic Variables (N = 272)  
 
 n P 
Gender*   
   Female 247 92 
   Male   23  9 
Status*   
   Single   25  9 
   Married 204 76 
   Living with significant other   10   4 
   Divorced   27 10 
   Widowed     4   2 
Race/Ethnicity*   
   Non-Hispanic White 240 89 
   Non-Hispanic Black     6   2 
   Hispanic/Latino     6    2 
   Asian/Pacific Islander    15   6 
   American Indian/Alaska Native     2 0.7 
Level of Education*   
   Diploma   53  20 
   Associate’s degree   73  27 
   Bachelor’s degree in nursing 104  39 
   Bachelor’s degree in other field   22   8 
   Master’s degree in nursing     9   3 
   Master’s degree in other field     6   2 
   Doctorate in other field     2  0.7 
Work Position*   
   Staff 230 86 
   Educator   21   8  
   Supervisor     4   2 
   Director     2 0.7 
   Faculty     2 0.7 
   RNFA     2 0.7 
   Manager     3   1 
   Retired     2 0.7 
   Full-Time Student     1 0.4 
Certification*   
   Yes 141 52 
   No 129 48 
Note. All items were not answered by the total sample (N = 272). *Indicates categories 
with missing data.  
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D. Results of the Findings 
 
 The Perioperative Nurse Questionnaire was the instrument I used to collect data 
on the responses of perioperative registered nurses in regard to intraoperative nursing 
errors. Definitions, causes, circumstances, reactions, coping, and changes in practices 
were the main topic areas from which I constructed items. The participants were willing 
to provide answers to the timely topic of errors in the surgical workplace. I presented the 
results of each research question according to the particular statistical method used for 
analysis.  
Research Question 1: How do perioperative nurses define intraoperative nursing errors? 
 All participants (N = 272) rated definitions of error according to a 4-point Likert 
scale as shown in Table 3. Perioperative nurses agreed strongly to the following 
definitions of error: (a) was unclear about surgical site (56%); (b) improperly placed 
electro-surgical unit (ESU) pad (54%); (c) improper patient positioning (59%); (d) 
miscalculated dose/strength of medication (72%); (e) inaccurate, incomplete, or absent 
surgical count (73%); (f) break in sterile technique (55%); (g) retained foreign object 
(69%); (h) equipment misuse related to lack of knowledge (51%); (i) was unaware of 
patient allergy (54%); and (j) misidentified a patient (69%). Responses varied on whether 
or not the participants agreed strongly to the following items as representing definitions 
of intraoperative nursing errors: (a) lack of appropriate equipment (27%), (b) blood or 
blood product transfusion reactions (28%), and (c) incorrect surgical prep (45%).  A 
majority of the perioperative nurses (45%) felt that a close call was the same as an error 
regardless of patient outcome. Twenty-six percent answered yes but only if there was 
direct patient harm, 18% chose no, regardless of the outcome, and 11% were unsure.  
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These findings suggested that the perioperative nurses believed a majority of the 
items represented errors for which they felt responsible, and could have resulted in 
distress or harm to a patient. The perioperative nurses felt that these errors would be 
within their locus of control and would have been judged wrong by knowledgeable peers. 
Although many of the participants considered a close call the same as an error regardless 
of patient outcome, other alternative definitions were also chosen implying confusion as 
to what constitutes a close call. 
Table 3 
Definitions of Intraoperative Nursing Error  
Items (N = 272) Disagree  
Strongly  
Disagree  
Somewhat  
Agree 
Somewhat  
Agree 
Strongly  
 
Unclear about surgical site 
 
35 (13%) 
 
21 (8%) 
   
  61 (23%) 
 
151 (56%) 
Improperly placed ESU pad 33 (12%) 25 (9%)   65 (24%) 145 (54%) 
Improper patient positioning 18 (7%) 25 (9%)   68 (25%) 157 (59%) 
Miscalculated dose/strength of 
medication 
24 (9%) 16 (6%)   35 (13%) 191 (72%) 
Inaccurate, incomplete, or 
absent surgical count 
23 (9%) 15 (6%)   35 (13%) 194 (73%) 
Break in sterile technique 12 (5%) 26 (10%)   82 (31%) 148 (56%) 
Retained foreign object 28 (10%) 17 (6%)   39 (15%) 184 (69%) 
Equipment misuse related to 
lack of knowledge 
  9 (3%) 28 (11%)   92 (35%) 136 (51%) 
Lack of appropriate equipment 18 (7%) 57 (22%) 118 (45%)   72 (27%) 
Blood or blood product 
transfusion reaction 
72 (27%) 60 (23%)   61 (23%)   74 (28%) 
Incorrect surgical prep 36 (14%) 36 (14%)   75 (28%) 120 (45%) 
Unaware of patient allergy 23 (9%) 32 (12%)   69 (26%) 144 (54%) 
Misidentified patient 46 (17%) 13 (5%)   24 (9%) 185 (69%) 
Note. All items were not answered by the total sample (N = 272). Percentages were 
rounded to the nearest whole number. 
 
Research Question 2: What are the circumstances of intraoperative errors? 
Of the total number of respondents (N = 272), 158 (58%) claimed they had 
committed errors. The time of the error occurred within the last 6 months for 26% of the 
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sample (n = 40), between 7 and 12 months for 9% (n = 14), more than 1 and up to 2 years 
for 12% (n = 18) and more than 2 and up to 4 years in 14% (n = 22). The majority of 
errors occurred more than 4 years prior to participation in the study (40%, n = 62). Table 
4 summarizes the nursing and patient variables for this sample related to the 
circumstances of the error.  
More than 38% of the respondents had greater than 10 years of perioperative 
nursing experience compared with 6 months to 2 years (28%), 3 to 6 years (26%), and 7 
to 10 years (6%). Most of the patients were between the ages of 18 and 65 (72%). Five 
percent of the patients were less than 18 years old and 24% were over 65 years of age. 
Fully functioning was the level chosen by 70% of the sample in describing their patients 
prior to the error. Fourteen percent of the sample reported that their patient’s functioning 
was mildly compromised prior to the error, 13% chose moderately compromised, and 3% 
reported severely compromised. The errors occurred primarily after the administration of 
anesthesia (64%). After the error, 59% of the perioperative nurses believed that their 
patients were not at all affected by the error while 15% of the patients were moderately 
affected, 20% were mildly affected, and 1% was severely affected. Five percent of the 
sample did not know how their patients were affected by the error.  
The types of surgical procedures in which the errors occurred also varied. Errors 
were committed in the full spectrum of surgical specialties with the highest number of 
errors occurring during general surgical procedures, followed by orthopedic, gynecologic, 
ophthalmic, and urologic surgeries. 
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Table 4 
Circumstances of Intraoperative Nursing Errors 
 n = 158 P 
 
Years of nursing experience* 
  
   6 months-2 years 44 28 
   3-6 years 41 26 
   7-10 years 10   6 
   More than 10 years 60 39 
   
Age of patient*   
   <18 years old    7   5 
     18-64 years old 112 72 
     65 years or older   37 24 
   
Patient level of functioning*   
   Fully functioning 108 70 
   Mildly compromised   22 14 
   Moderately compromised   20 13 
   Severely compromised     5   3 
   
Prior or after anesthesia*   
   Prior 21 14 
   After 99 64 
   Not Applicable 36 23 
   
Patient Affected*   
   Not at all 92 59 
   Mildly 24 15 
   Moderately 31 20 
   Severely   2   1 
   Don’t know   7   5 
Note. All items were not answered by the total number of participants who committed an 
error (n = 158).Total study sample (N = 272). *Indicates categories with missing data. 
Percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number. 
 
Research Question 3: What are the perceived causes of intraoperative nursing errors? 
 The items constructed for the causes of errors were reviewed as well as 
recommended by a panel of perioperative nursing experts and rated according to a 
content validity index (see Appendix J). Causes of the error were categorized according 
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to the participants’ perceptions relating to occurrence and description of the error. 
Subscales were constructed from the items related to causes of error. The subscales were 
(a) inexperience, (b) lack of supervision, (c) job overload, and (d) faulty judgment. 
Participants primarily disagreed strongly on items pertaining to why the error occurred. 
However, 31% of respondents disagreed with the item, I was distracted, while 31% 
agreed somewhat and 28% agreed strongly. Forty-eight percent of the perioperative 
nurses disagreed strongly to the item, I did not follow standard policy and procedure, 
with 22% agreeing somewhat to the same item. Thirty-seven percent of the participants 
disagreed strongly to there being miscommunication among team members, but 36% 
agreed strongly to the same item. In addition, 33% disagreed strongly with feeling that 
they had too many things to do at once while 27% agreed somewhat and 27% agreed 
strongly. Sixty-seven percent disagreed strongly in the belief that the system in which 
they worked was defective. 
 It may be inferred from the findings that the participants negated both internal and 
external factors as causes of error. External reasons such as inadequate supervision, lack 
of appropriate equipment, and improper orientation were not supported as causes of error 
nor were the internal factors of unfamiliarity with the procedure, and being tired. Table 5 
presents the perioperative nurses’ responses to the question as to why the error occurred 
as measured on a 4-point Likert scale. Missing data for these questions were identified 
and coded in SPSS 13.0. 
 Description of the error was identified by nine items as shown in Table 6. The 
items representing description were included in the same subscales used for causes of 
error.  
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Table 5 
Occurrences of Error 
Statements (n = 158) Disagree 
Strongly    
Disagree 
Somewhat  
Agree 
Somewhat  
Agree 
Strongly  
 
(I) I was unfamiliar with procedure  
 
110 (71%) 
 
19 (12%) 
 
15 (10%) 
 
11 (7%) 
(LS) I was responsible but 
someone else made the mistake 
  80 (51%) 23 (15%) 29 (19%) 25 (16%) 
(I) I did not have enough 
information 
  87 (56%) 18 (12%) 22 (14%) 28 (18%) 
(FJ) I made up my mind too 
quickly 
  87 (56%) 15 (10%) 32 (21%) 22 (14%) 
(JO) I was distracted   48 (31%) 16 (10%) 49 (31%) 43 (28%) 
(LS) Inadequate supervision by 
managers 
114 (73%) 18 (12%) 14 (9%) 10 (6%) 
(LS) Inadequate staffing levels   99 (63%) 17 (11%) 19 (12%) 22 (14%) 
(LS) Lack of appropriate 
equipment or supplies 
120 (78%) 15 (10%)   9 (6%) 10 (7%) 
(JO) I was tired 101 (65%) 25 (16%) 17 (11%) 12 (8%) 
(LS) The system was defective 104 (67%) 19 (13%) 23 (15%)   9 (6%) 
(FJ) I did not follow standard 
policy and procedure 
  75 (48%) 23 (15%) 34 (22%) 24 (15%) 
(I) I was not properly oriented 116 (76%) 15 (10%)   9 (6%) 13 (9%) 
(LS) Miscommunication among 
team members 
  57 (37%) 10 (6%) 33 (21%) 56 (36%) 
(JO) I had too many things to do at 
once 
  51 (33%) 21 (14%) 42 (27%) 42 (27%) 
Note. All items were not answered by the total number of participants who committed an 
error (n = 158).Total study sample (N = 272). Percentages were rounded to the nearest 
whole number. Subscales are identified as follows: (I) = inexperience; (LS) = lack of 
supervision; (FJ) = faulty judgment; and, (JO) = job overload. 
  
 A high percentage (82%) of perioperative nurses did not believe they acted 
beyond their competence, had a lapse of memory (74%), gave inaccurate or inadequate 
information (71%), or missed the warning signs (69%). I missed the warning signs and I 
acted beyond my competence were two items included in the subscale of inexperience. 
From the results it may be surmised that many of the perioperative nurses did not believe 
inexperience to be a factor in error causation. It was determined that 39% of the sample 
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had more than 10 years of experience. In regards to inadequate communication on the 
part of the perioperative nurses, 50% disagreed strongly, 12% disagreed somewhat, 21% 
agreed somewhat, and 18% agreed strongly. Over one half of the perioperative nurses in 
this study believed that a lack of communication on their part was not a cause of their 
error. Missing data for these questions were identified and coded in SPSS 13.0. 
Table 6 
Description of Error  
Statements (n = 158) Disagree 
Strongly    
Disagree 
Somewhat  
Agree 
Somewhat  
Agree 
Strongly  
 
(I) My attention wandered 
  
   85 (54%) 
 
17 (11%) 
 
37 (24%) 
 
18 (12%) 
(JO) I had a lapse of memory 116 (74%) 18 (12%) 14 (9%)   9 (6%) 
(FJ) I made the wrong decision   80 (51%) 16 (10%) 38 (24%) 23 (15%) 
(FJ) I assessed the situation 
wrongly 
  91 (59%) 19 (12%) 28 (18%) 17 (11%) 
(I) I missed the warning signs 108 (69%) 19 (12%) 15 (10%) 14 (9%) 
(FJ) I gave inaccurate or 
inadequate information 
112 (71%) 16 (10%) 16 (10%) 13 (8%) 
(FJ) I relied on someone else’s 
judgment 
  72 (46%) 15 (10%) 27 (17%) 44 (28%) 
(I) I acted beyond my competence 129 (82%) 13 (8%) 10 (6%)   5 (3%) 
(FJ) I did not communicate enough   78 (50%) 18 (12%) 33 (21%) 28 (18%) 
Note. All items were not answered by the total number of participants who committed an 
error (n = 158).Total study sample (N = 272). Percentages were rounded to the nearest 
whole number. Subscales are identified as follows. (I) = inexperience; (LS) = lack of 
supervision; (FJ) = faulty judgment; and, (JO) = job overload. 
 
 The items representing causes of the error were then grouped into the four 
subscales of inexperience, lack of supervision, job overload, and faulty judgment. The 
total mean scores were computed if each respondent answered 70% of the questions in 
each subscale. If the scale had only 2 questions as in the case of institutional response, the 
means were computed if both questions were answered. Cronbach’s index of internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) measures the extent to which the obtained score is a 
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measure of the true score. An acceptable measure of reliability for a psychometric 
instrument to be considered useful is at approximately .70 (Aron, & Aron, 1997). 
Table 7 shows the means, standard deviations, and reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s 
alpha) for the scales. Because of the low internal consistency value of .59, the items may 
not adequately represent job overload. 
Table 7 
Subscales Representing Causes of Error 
Scales Number of Items M SD Cronbach’s    
Causes of Error 
  Inexperience 
  Lack of supervision 
  Job overload 
  Faulty judgment 
 
5 
6 
4 
7 
 
 
1.57 
1.80 
2.11 
1.96 
 
.648 
.669 
.740 
.686 
 
.69 
.69 
.59 
.70 
 
 Respondents were asked to rate items related to the operating room (OR) 
atmosphere at the time the error occurred. There were six items that described the 
atmosphere of the OR including staff conflict, a stressful environment, shortcut practices, 
communication, inadequate staffing, and non-supportive managers. The variables that 
represented the OR atmosphere that were most disagreed strongly to by the participants 
were (a) conflict among the staff (67%), (b) taking shortcuts was normal practice in the 
OR (60%), (c) managers’ attitudes (56%), and (d) short staff practices (53%). Again, 
participants were split as to communication being a factor in error occurrence with 29% 
disagreeing strongly, 29% agreeing somewhat, and 28% agreeing strongly. Table 8 shows 
the participants’ responses to questions about the operating room atmosphere. Missing 
data for these questions were identified and coded in SPSS 13.0. 
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Table 8 
Operating Room Atmosphere 
Statements (n = 158) Disagree 
Strongly    
Disagree 
Somewhat  
Agree 
Somewhat  
Agree 
Strongly  
 
The environment in the OR was 
particularly stressful 
   
  39 (25%) 
 
31 (20%) 
 
49 (31%) 
 
38 (24%) 
There was conflict among the  
staff in the OR 
105 (67%) 29 (18%) 16 (10%)   8 (5%) 
Managers just expected you to 
get on with the work regardless 
  88 (56%) 17 (11%) 31 (20%) 20 (13%) 
Taking “short cuts” was almost 
the norm 
  95 (60%) 30 (19%) 21 (13%) 12 (8%) 
It was common practice to be 
short staffed 
  84 (53%) 23 (15%) 33 (21%) 18 (11%) 
There was not enough 
communication among the staff in 
the OR 
  45 (29%) 22 (14%) 45 (29%) 44 (28%) 
Note. All items were not answered by the total number of participants who committed an 
error (n = 158).Total study sample (N = 272). Percentages were rounded to the nearest 
whole number. 
 
Research Question 4: To what extent do perioperative nurses experience emotional  
distress after committing an error?  
 
 Table 9 shows how the participants answered items on reactions to an error they 
may have made. A number of perioperative nurses agreed strongly (73%) that they were 
angry with themselves but not necessarily angry at other people (41%). Some 
perioperative nurses felt inadequate (42%), guilty (59%), or embarrassed (48%). 
Although it was previously identified that 59% of the perioperative nurses believed that 
their patients were unaffected by the error, 60% felt devastated that they may have hurt 
their patients in some way. The item related to being indifferent was strongly disagreed to 
by 87% of the perioperative nurses indicating that some level of emotional distress was 
felt by a sizeable number of participants. Missing data for these questions were identified 
and coded in SPSS 13.0. 
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Table 9 
Reactions to the Error Denoted as Emotional Distress 
Statements (n = 158) Disagree 
Strongly    
Disagree 
Somewhat  
Agree 
Somewhat  
Agree 
Strongly  
 
I was angry with myself 
     
    7 (5%) 
   
  5 (3%) 
 
31 (20%) 
 
114 (73%) 
I was angry at other people   65 (41%) 32 (20%) 29 (19%)   31 (20%) 
I felt inadequate   34 (22%) 20 (13%) 37 (24%)   66 (42%) 
I was fearful of repercussions   43 (27%) 28 (18%) 39 (25%)   47 (30%) 
I felt guilty   17 (11%)   7 (5%) 41 (26%)   92 (59%) 
I was indifferent 135 (87%) 12 (8%)   6 (4%)     3 (2%) 
I felt embarrassed   23 (15%) 14 (9%) 43 (28%)   75 (48%) 
I felt devastated that I may have 
hurt someone 
  26 (17%) 12 (8%) 25 (16%)   93 (60%) 
I believe that my actions were 
reasonable 
  56 (36%) 28 (18%) 49 (31%)   23 (15%) 
I became depressed   74 (47%) 33 (21%) 30 (19%)   19 (12%) 
Note. All items were not answered by the total number of participants who committed an 
error (n = 158).Total study sample (N = 272). Percentages were rounded to the nearest 
whole number. 
 
Of the perioperative nurses who committed an error (n = 158), a large number of 
them (n = 149) talked with someone about the experience. Most talked with a nurse 
manager or supervisor (77%), a colleague (60%), or a physician (65%). Table 10 
summarizes how often the perioperative nurses talked with someone about their error, 
and if they did not talk with anyone, what were the reasons chosen. Three of the 
participants spoke with a lawyer and two listed a therapist or employee assistance 
representative. These responses were listed in the “other” category.  
Research Question 5: How do perioperative nurses cope with committing an 
intraoperative error? 
  
 A shortened version of the Ways of Coping Scale by Folkman and Lazarus (1984) 
was used to measure the coping strategies of the participants in this study (see Appendix 
A). There were a total of 16 items that represented the six subscales.  
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Table 10 
Communication About the Error  
 Frequency (f) Percent (P) 
 
Talked about error ( n = 149) 
 
149 
 
94 
   Manager/Supervisor 115 77 
   Colleague   90 60 
   Physician   97 65 
   Non-nursing friend   19 13 
   Member of professional organization     8   5 
   Patient     8   5 
   Patient Relative     2   1 
   Spouse/Significant other     49 33 
   
Did not talk about the error ( n = 9)    9   6 
   I was worried what others might think    4 29 
   I was fearful of repercussions    1   7 
   I didn’t think it was important    1   7 
   There was no harm to the patient    8  57 
Note. Percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number. 
The six subscales include accepting responsibility, seeking social support, self-
controlling, distancing, escape-avoidance, and planful problem solving.  
 The items comprising the subscale accepting responsibility were (a) I criticized or 
lectured myself, (b) I promised to do things differently next time, and (c) I apologized or 
did something to make up. Seeking social support was represented by the following 
items: (a) I accepted sympathy and understanding from someone, (b) I asked a relative or 
friend I respected for advice, and (c) I talked to someone about how I was feeling. The 
items categorized into the subscale of self-controlling were (a) I tried to keep my feelings 
to myself, (b) I kept others from knowing how bad things were, and (c) I tried to keep my 
feelings from interfering with other things too much. The items representing distancing 
were (a) I went on as if nothing had happened, (b) I tried to forget the whole thing, and 
(c) I didn’t let it get to me; I refused to think about it too much. I wished the situation 
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would go away or somehow be over, and I had fantasies about how things might turn out 
were the items representing escape-avoidance. All of the above subscales were classified 
as emotion-focused forms of coping. Distancing and escape/avoidance were considered 
negative forms of coping.  
 Problem-focused forms of coping were grouped into the subscale, planful-
problem solving. The items comprising the scale were I made a plan of action and 
followed it, and I knew what had to be done, so I doubled my efforts to make things work. 
Only 5% of the sample indicated they did not use the problem-focused strategy of making 
and following a plan of action. This indicates an effort made on the part of the 
perioperative nurses to use problem solving techniques in managing the error.  
 Low internal consistency scores for the coping subscales of escape/avoidance 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .59) and planful problem solving (Cronbach’s alpha = .50) call into 
question the reliability of the items in measuring the constructs. Table 11 shows the 
frequencies of all of the identified coping strategies used by the sample according to a 4-
point Likert scale. Table 12 provides the frequencies, means, standard deviations, and 
internal consistency values for the coping subscales of accepting responsibility, seeking 
social support, self-control, escape-avoidance, planful problem solving, and distancing. 
Missing data for these questions were identified and coded in SPSS 13.0. 
 There was interaction with management in 77% (n = 121) of the sample. Of those 
nurses who interacted with a manager, 61% (n = 74) discussed the error, 58% (n = 69) 
were counseled, and 40% (n = 47) were disciplined. The respondents appeared to be 
satisfied with how the error was handled and how they personally felt after discussion 
with a manager.  
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Table 11 
Coping with the Error 
Statements (n = 158) Not Used Used Used quite 
a lot 
Used a great 
deal 
 
I criticized or lectured myself 
    
  24 (15%) 
 
59 (38%) 
 
34 (22%) 
 
40 (26%) 
I went on as if nothing had happened 124 (79%) 27 (17%)   4 (3%)   3 (2%) 
I tried to keep my feelings to myself   68 (43%) 57 (36%) 20 (13%) 12 (8%) 
I accepted sympathy and understanding 
from someone 
  77 (49%) 66 (42%) 10 (6%)   5 (3%) 
I tried to forget the whole thing 118 (75%) 27 (17%)   7 (5%)  6 (4%) 
I made a plan of action and followed it   14 (9%) 48 (31%) 40 (26%) 55 (35%) 
I didn’t let it get to me; I refused to 
think about it too much 
  95 (61%) 48 (31%)   8 (5%)   5 (3%) 
I asked a relative or friend I respected 
for advice 
120 (76%) 24 (15%) 10 (6%)   4 (3%) 
I kept others from knowing how bad 
things were 
115 (73%) 28 (18%)   8 (5%)   6 (4%) 
I talked to someone about how I was 
feeling 
  56 (36%) 65 (41%)  18 (12%) 18 (12%) 
I knew what had to be done, so I 
doubled my efforts to make thing work 
  37 (24%) 48 (31%) 35 (22%) 37 (24%) 
I tried to keep my feelings from 
interfering with other things too much 
  25 (16%) 65 (42%) 41 (26%) 25 (16%) 
I wished the situation would go away or 
somehow be over 
  91 (58%) 38 (24%) 15 (10%) 14 (9%) 
I had fantasies about how things might 
turn out 
105 (67%) 35 (22%) 11 (7%)   7 (4%) 
I promised to do things differently next 
time 
  12 (8%) 40 (25%) 31 (20%) 75 (48%) 
I apologized or did something to make 
up 
  61 (39%) 45 (29%)  20 (13%) 31 (20%) 
Note. All items were not answered by the total number of participants who committed an 
error (n = 158). Total study sample (N = 272). Percentages were rounded to the nearest 
whole number. 
  
The items were grouped into the subscales representing managerial responses as being 
either supportive or judgmental. Items representing supportive were (a) I felt supported 
for the way the case was handled; (b) I believed steps would be taken to prevent future, 
similar errors; and (c) I maintained my sense of competence.  
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Table 12 
Coping Strategies Subscales  
Subscale Number of Items M SD Cronbach’s    
Coping Strategies 
  Accepting responsibility 
  Seeking social support 
  Self-control 
  Escape/avoidance 
  Planful problem solving 
  Distancing 
 
 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
 
2.59 
1.38 
1.67 
1.60 
2.67 
1.89 
 
.79 
.56 
.62 
.75 
.85 
.71 
 
.61 
.73 
.66 
.59 
.50 
.72 
 
Judgmental items were (a) I lost professional respect, (b) I felt humiliated, (c) the real 
cause of the error was not tackled, (d) the action taken against me far outweighed the 
seriousness of the error, (e) I felt I was used as a scapegoat, and (f) overall, the 
administration was judgmental about my mistake. Table 13 shows the response 
frequencies to each item noting that missing data for these questions were identified and 
coded in SPSS 13.0. Table 14 reflects the means, standard deviations, and reliability 
coefficients for the managerial response subscales. Internal consistency was found to be 
low for the subscale representing managerial support (Cronbach’s alpha = .38). Thus, the 
reliability of the participants’ responses is questionable in regard to managerial support. 
 Participants were asked if they experienced any changes in practice as a 
consequence of having made the error. Changes in practice were divided into 
constructive and defensive categories. The nine items that reflected constructive changes 
in practice were (a) I asked my colleagues what they would have done in a similar 
situation, (b) I pay more attention to detail, (c) I try to read the patient’s chart more 
carefully, (d) I am more likely to seek advice, (e) I keep better documentation on the 
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patients, (f) I do more observations on patients, (g) I follow policies and procedures more 
closely, and (h) I listen to patients more closely. 
Table 13 
Discussion with Manager After Committing an Error 
Statements (n = 121) Disagree 
Strongly    
Disagree 
Somewhat  
Agree 
Somewhat  
Agree 
Strongly  
 
I lost professional respect 
   
  85 (70%) 
 
15 (12%) 
 
17 (14%) 
   
  4 (3%) 
I felt supported for the way the 
case was handled 
  10 (8%) 12 (10%) 43 (36%) 56 (46%) 
I felt humiliated   63 (52%) 20 (17%) 24 (20%) 14 (12%) 
The real cause of the error was 
not tackled 
  67 (55%) 12 (10%) 27 (22%) 15 (12%) 
The action taken against me far 
outweighed the seriousness of the 
error 
104 (86%) 11 (9%)   3 (3%)   3 (3%) 
I felt I was used as a scapegoat   95 (79%) 13 (11%)   7 (6%)   6 (5%) 
I believed steps would be taken to 
prevent future, similar errors 
  18 (15%) 13 (11%) 46 (38%) 44 (36%) 
Overall, the administration was 
judgmental about my mistake 
  81 (68%) 22 (18%) 13 (11%)   4 (3%) 
I maintained my sense of 
competence 
    2 (2%)   7 (6%) 41 (34%) 70 (58%) 
Note. All items were not answered by the total number of participants that discussed the 
error with a manager (n = 121). Percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number. 
 
Table 14 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliability Coefficients for Managerial Response 
Subscales 
 
Subscale Number of Items M SD Cronbach’s    
Managerial Response 
  Judgmental 
  Supportive 
 
6 
3 
 
1.57 
3.21 
 
.65 
.60 
 
.81 
.38 
 
  Six items were used to measure defensive changes and included (a) I feel less 
confident in my work, (b) I get more worried, (c) I am less trusting of others’ capability, 
and (d) I am more likely to keep an error to myself if at all possible. Eighty-one percent 
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(n = 127), of the participants strongly agreed that they now pay more attention to detail 
when caring for their patients. More than 50% did not lose confidence in their work 
leading them to continue caring for similar patients. A majority of the sample, 75%, 
disagreed strongly with the item, I thought about leaving nursing. Sixty-seven percent 
were not likely to keep an error to themselves which relates to previous data on talking 
with someone about the error. Table 15 shows the responses to changes in practice 
according to the 4-point Likert scale noting that missing data for these questions were 
identified and coded in SPSS 13.0. Table 16 shows the means, standard deviations, and 
the reliability coefficients for the changes in practice subscales. 
Research Question 6: What is the relationship between coping with intraoperative 
nursing errors and changes in practice? 
 
 Six subscales representing coping strategies including accepting responsibility, 
distancing, seeking social support, escape-avoidance, planful problem solving, and self-
control were correlated with the two subscales representing constructive and defensive 
changes in practice. The items that compose constructive changes in practice were (a) I 
asked my colleagues what they would have done in a similar situation, (b) I pay more 
attention to detail, (c) I try to read the patient’s chart more carefully, (d) I am more likely 
to seek advice, (e) I keep better documentation on the patients, (f) I do more observations 
on patients, (g) I follow policies and procedures more carefully, (h) I listen to patients 
more closely, and (i) I slow down more. The items that compose defensive changes in 
practice were (a) I feel less confident in my work, (b) I get more worried, (c) I am less 
trusting of others’ capability, (d) I am more likely to keep an error to myself if at all 
possible, (e) I try to avoid similar patients or procedures or both, and (f) I thought about 
leaving nursing.  
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Table 15 
Changes in Practice  
 
Statements (n = 158) 
 
Disagree 
Strongly    
 
Disagree 
Somewhat  
 
Agree 
Somewhat  
 
Agree 
Strongly  
 
(C) I asked my colleagues what 
they would have done in a 
similar situation 
   
  67 (44%) 
 
24 (16%) 
 
45 (29%) 
   
  18 (12%) 
(C) I pay more attention to detail     0 (0%)   0 (0%) 29 (19%) 127 (81%) 
(D) I feel less confident in my 
work 
  87 (56%) 35 (22%) 30 (19%)     4 (3%) 
(C) I try to read the patient’s 
chart more carefully 
  42 (28%) 18 (12%) 49 (33%)   41(27%) 
(D) I get more worried   72 (47%) 41 (27%) 31 (20%)   11 (7%) 
(D) I am less trusting of others’ 
capability 
  45 (29%) 27 (17%) 57 (37%)   26 (17%) 
(C) I am more likely to seek 
advice 
  38 (25%) 23 (15%) 70 (46%)   23 (15%) 
(C) I keep better documentation 
on the patients 
  44 (29%) 14 (9%) 44 (29%)   52 (34%) 
(D) I am more likely to keep an 
error to myself if at all possible 
103 (67%) 39 (25%)   8 (5%)     5 (3%) 
(C) I do more observations on 
patients 
  34 (22%) 27 (18%) 57 (38%)   34 (22%) 
(C) I follow policies and 
procedures more closely 
  18 (12%) 16 (11%) 52 (34%)   67 (44%) 
(C) I listen to patients more 
closely 
  40 (27%) 22 (15%) 50 (33%)   38 (25%) 
(D) I try to avoid similar patients 
or procedures or both 
117 (77%) 20 (13%)   8 (5%)   7 (5%) 
(C) I slow down more   29 (19%) 22 (15%) 69 (45%) 32 (21%) 
(D) I thought about leaving 
nursing 
116 (75%) 14 (9%) 20 (13%)   5 (3%) 
Note. All items were not answered by the total number of participants who committed an 
error (n = 158).Total study sample (N = 272). Percentages were rounded to the nearest 
whole number. (C) = constructive changes in practice; (D) = defensive changes in 
practice. 
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Table 16 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliability Coefficients for Changes in Practice 
Subscales 
 
Subscale Number of Items M SD Cronbach’s    
Changes in Practice 
  Constructive 
  Defensive 
 
9 
6 
 
2.74 
1.70 
 
.67 
.56 
 
.83 
.69 
 
 
 A strong relationship was found between accepting responsibility and defensive 
changes in practice, r = .35, p = .000 as opposed to accepting responsibility and 
constructive changes in practice, r = .18, p = .03.  The relationships between the coping 
strategy subscales and changes in practice are shown in Table 17. 
Table 17 
Relationships Between the Coping Strategy Subscales and Changes in Practice 
Note.*p < .05; **p < .01. The coping strategy subscales include accepting responsibility, 
distancing, seeking social support, escape-avoidance, planful problem solving, and self-
control. 
 
 After controlling for the independent variables, multiple regression analysis was 
also performed to answer research question 6 and to determine the relationship of coping 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
1.   Accepting 
Responsibility 
 
 
- 
       
2.   Distancing -.15 -       
3.   Seeking Social 
Support 
 
.29** 
 
-.04 
 
- 
     
4.   Escape 
Avoidance 
 
.39** 
 
.17* 
 
.31** 
 
- 
    
5.   Planful Problem 
Solving 
 
.44** 
 
.05 
 
.20* 
 
.20* 
 
- 
   
6.   Self Control .30** .30* .02 .49** .26** -   
7.   Constructive 
Changes 
 
.18* 
 
.03 
 
.25** 
 
.27** 
 
.34** 
 
.20* 
 
- 
 
 
8.   Defensive 
Changes 
 
.35** 
 
.12 
 
.23** 
 
.52** 
 
.12 
 
.37** 
 
.32** 
 
- 
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strategies used by the participants and changes in practice instituted by the nurses after 
committing an error. Table 18 shows the multiple regression analysis model used to 
depict the independent coping variables and constructive changes in practice.  
 As illustrated in Table 18, the coping strategies of seeking social support and 
planful problem solving were significant predictors of constructive changes in practice. 
The beta weights for seeking social support, 
 
 = .20, *p < .05 and planful problem 
solving, 
 
 = .29, **p < .001 showed the predictive importance of each separate 
independent variable to the model. The multiple correlation coefficient (R2 ) in the model 
for constructive changes in practice was .20 accounting for 20% of the variance. This 
result demonstrated the joint contributions of all the coping strategy independent 
variables to the dependent variable of constructive changes in practice.   
Table 18 
Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Constructive Changes in Practice 
(N = 158) 
 
Variable 
 
B SE B 
 
 (beta) 
 
Accepting responsibility 
 
-0.11 
 
0.80 
 
-.12 
Distancing  0.03 0.10   .02 
Seeking social support  0.21 0.09    .20* 
Escape avoidance  0.11 0.08  .13 
Planful problem solving  0.23 0.07      .29** 
Self control  0.13 0.09   .14 
Note. Multiple correlation coefficient (R2 = .20); *p < .05; **p < .001 
 Table 19 presents a second multiple regression model designed to predict 
defensive changes in practice from the coping strategy variables. Analysis indicated that 
the positive coping strategies, accepting responsibility for the error, 
 
 = .17, *p < .05 and 
using self-control, 
 
 = .17, *p < .05 were significant predictors of defensive changes in 
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practice. In addition, escape-avoidance deemed a negative coping strategy was a 
significant predictor of defensive changes in practice, 
 
 = .33, **p < .001. The results 
demonstrated the unique contribution of each of these independent variables to the 
model. The total R2 for this model was .33 which explained 33% of the variance, thus 
estimating the power of all the independent variables in predicting defensive changes in 
practice. 
Table 19 
Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Defensive Changes in Practice 
(N = 158) 
 
Variable 
 
B SE B 
 
 (beta) 
Accepting responsibility  0.12 0.06  .17* 
Distancing  0.80 0.08 .08 
Seeking social support  1.00 0.07 .11 
Escape/avoidance  0.25 0.06    .34** 
Planful problem solving -0.05 0.05 -.08 
Self control  0.13 0.07  .17* 
Note. Multiple correlation coefficient (R2 = .33); *p < .05; **p < .001 
Research Question 7: What is the relationship between coping with intraoperative 
nursing errors and emotional distress? 
 
 The coping strategy subscales as described in the previous section were also 
correlated with the ten items representing the dependent variable of emotional distress 
which were (a) I was angry with myself, (b) I was angry at other people, (c) I felt 
inadequate, (d) I was fearful of repercussions, (e) I felt guilty, (f) I was indifferent, (g) I 
felt embarrassed, (h) I felt devastated that I may have hurt someone, (i) I believe that my 
actions were reasonable, and (j) I became depressed. Statistically significant relationships 
were found between all of the variables with the exception of distancing. One subscale, 
accepting responsibility, was highly correlated with emotional distress, r = .55, p = .000.  
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A strong and statistically significant relationship was also found between the coping 
strategy of escape/avoidance and emotional distress, r = .48, p = .000. Table 20 
summarizes the relationships using Pearson product-moment correlation (r) between the 
coping variable subscales and the dependent variable of emotional distress. 
Table 20 
Relationships Between the Coping Strategy Subscales and Emotional Distress 
Note.*p < .05; **p < .01. The coping strategy subscales include accepting responsibility, 
distancing, seeking social support, escape-avoidance, planful problem solving, and self-
control 
 
 Regression analysis was also used to answer research question 7. The third model 
predicted emotional distress from the coping strategy variables. Data presented in Table 
20 indicates that accepting responsibility, 
 
 = .34, **p < .001 and using self-control 
 
 = 
.38, **p < .001 were significant predictors of emotional distress. This model explained 
47% of the variance (R2 = .47) in the dependent variable of emotional distress based upon 
all of the independent coping strategy variables combined. 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. Accepting 
    responsibility 
 
 
- 
      
2. Distancing -.15 -      
3. Seeking social 
    support 
 
.29** 
 
-.04 
 
- 
    
4. Escape  
    avoidance 
 
.39** 
 
.17* 
 
.31** 
 
- 
   
5. Planful problem 
    solving 
 
.44** 
 
.05 
 
.20* 
 
.20* 
 
- 
  
6. Self  
    control 
 
.30** 
 
.30* 
 
.02 
. 
49** 
 
.26** 
 
- 
 
7. Emotional  
    distress 
 
.55** 
 
-.05 
 
.28** 
 
.48** 
 
.22** 
 
.47** 
 
- 
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Table 21 
Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Emotional Distress 
(N = 158) 
 
Variable 
 
B SE B 
 
 (beta) 
Accepting responsibility  0.26 0.06      .34** 
Distancing -0.07 0.07 -.06 
Seeking social support  0.14 0.07 .15 
Escape/avoidance  0.11 0.06 .14 
Planful problem solving -0.07 0.05 -.01 
Self control  0.32 0.06      .38** 
Note. Multiple correlation coefficient (R2 = .47); ** p < .001 
Additional Correlation Procedures 
 Correlational procedures were conducted to determine any relationships that may 
have existed between the independent variable subscales of causes of error and 
managerial response and the dependent variables of constructive and defensive changes 
in practice and emotional distress. Causes of the error were grouped into the subscales 
represented by inexperience, lack of supervision, job overload, and faulty judgment. 
Table 22 summarizes the relationships using Pearson product-moment correlation (r) 
between the independent and dependent variables including causes of error, emotional 
distress, and constructive and defensive changes in practice. Statistically significant 
relationships were found between all of the variables with the exception of job overload. 
The Cronbach’s index score for job overload was .59. The overall results suggest that 
those perioperative nurses who believed that their error occurred due to inexperience, 
lack of supervision, and faulty judgment encountered emotional distress and used both 
constructive and defensive changes in practice. Descriptive statistical analysis indicated 
that a majority of the perioperative nurses did not perceive inexperience as a factor in 
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error causation. Job overload was not correlated with any of the variables, thus it may be 
that the participants did not perceive job overload as a cause of error. 
 The subscales representing supportive and judgmental managerial responses were 
correlated with the dependent variables of emotional distress and changes in practice. 
Table 22 
 
Relationships Between Causes of Error Subscale, Emotional Distress, and Changes in 
Practice 
Subscale (Causes of 
Error) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Inexperience -       
2. Lack of supervision .50** -      
3. Job overload -.005 .13 -     
4. Faulty judgment .30**    .45**    .11 -    
5. Emotional distress .29**     .42**    .13    .36** -   
6. Constructive changes .26**     .31**    .01    .25**    .27** -  
7. Defensive changes .27**     .45**    .12    .27**    .54**    .32** - 
Note.*p < .05; **p < .01.The causes of error subscales include inexperience, lack of 
supervision, job overload, and faulty judgment. 
 
Items representing the supportive subscale were (a) I felt supported for the way the case 
was handled, (b) I believed steps would be taken to prevent future, similar errors, and (c) 
I maintained my sense of competence. Items representing the judgmental subscale were 
(a) I lost professional respect, (b) I felt humiliated, (c) the real cause of the error was not 
tackled, (d) the action taken against me far outweighed the seriousness of the error, (e) I 
felt I was used as a scapegoat, and (f) overall, the administration was judgmental about 
my mistake. A strong and statistically significant relationship was shown between a 
judgmental response on the part of the manager and defensive changes in practice, r = 
.56, p = .000.  A significant negative relationship between managerial support and 
defensive changes in practice was also shown. The relationships demonstrated that those 
participants who indicated a supportive environment tended to use less defensive changes 
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in practice, while those participants who felt that the management was judgmental used 
defensive changes in practice. Table 23 illustrates the relationships between the 
supportive and constructive managerial response subscales and the dependent variables of 
emotional distress and constructive and defensive changes in practice.  
Table 23 
Relationships Between the Managerial Response Subscales, Emotional Distress, and  
Changes in Practice 
Note.*p < .05; **p < .01. The managerial response subscales are represented by the items 
judgmental and supportive. 
 
D. Discussion of the Results 
 
The results of the study are discussed in this section. The section is organized 
according to each research question. The conceptual framework that guided this study 
was derived from Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) cognitive theory of psychological stress 
and coping. Important to this theory is that coping involves the use of both problem and 
emotion focused strategies. Problem-focused forms of coping are used whereby an 
individual has determined that the conditions precipitated by a stressful event are 
amenable to change. Emotion-focused forms of coping are utilized if an individual 
appraises the condition as too harmful or threatening, thereby reducing the probability of 
modifying the condition. Both forms of coping are used by individuals who are faced 
with real life stressful encounters.  
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
1. Judgmental 
 
- 
    
2. Supportive   .47** -    
3. Emotional distress   .36**   -.14 -   
4. Constructive changes .22*     .17 .27** -  
5. Defensive changes   .56**       -.33** .32** .54** - 
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For this study, an intraoperative nursing error represented the stressful event for 
the perioperative nurses. The mediating processes used by the perioperative nurses in 
response to committing an error were the emotion and problem focused forms of coping. 
The adaptational outcomes resulting from this process were levels of emotional distress, 
and constructive and defensive changes in practice. Application of the conceptual 
framework that guided this study (see Figure 1) is integrated throughout this section. 
Research Question 1: How do Perioperative Nurses Define Intraoperative Nursing 
Errors? 
 
 The first research question, how do perioperative nurses define intraoperative 
nursing errors, was asked of all participants (N = 272) so that errors specific to the 
intraoperative phase could be categorized apart from the preoperative and postoperative 
phases of perioperative nursing. Because a majority of the perioperative nurses worked in 
a staff position within surgical services, (n = 230), it may be concluded that their 
responses were based on their own clinical experiences. There was generalized agreement 
on the definitions of intraoperative nursing errors with the exception of two responses. 
Interestingly, only 27% of the participants agreed strongly that a blood or blood product 
transfusion reaction was an intraoperative nursing error. This may be because 
administration of blood products in the operating room (OR) is primarily the 
responsibility of the anesthesia care provider. Also, the results from the question relating 
to OR equipment seemed to indicate that there was some confusion in regard to 
terminology. A higher percentage of respondents may have chosen the item related to 
equipment if equipment malfunction had been used instead of lack of appropriate 
equipment. According to AORN, the safe use of equipment and the administration of 
blood therapy products are considered standard perioperative competencies (2006).  
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The analysis of data in regard to the first research question supports previous 
research on intraoperative errors. For example, in a review of incident reports Chappy 
(2006) found that the most commonly reported errors were incorrect or omitted counts, 
equipment malfunction, and medication. In addition, agreement by the participants on a 
majority of the items identified as definitions of intraoperative nursing errors correlated 
well with the focused areas established by the AORN Presidential Commission on Patient 
Safety. The areas identified by the commission were correct site surgery, medication 
safety, patient positioning, counts, retained foreign objects, and blood transfusions 
(Watson, 2003).   
 To further support the findings relative to the first research question, I reviewed 
the perioperative nursing data set, which is a structured vocabulary specific to 
perioperative nursing (Beyea, 2002). The taxonomy is organized according to domains 
and safety is the first domain. It is concluded in the domain of safety that freedom from 
physical injury incurred during a surgical or invasive procedure is the desired patient 
outcome. Interventions are directed toward prevention of patient harm and reflected the 
areas represented in the questionnaire as definitions of intraoperative nursing errors. 
These included injury from equipment, instrumentation, sponges or sharps, thermal, 
mechanical, and electrical sources of injury, medication errors, and patient positioning.  
 Other findings from the first research questions were not supported in the 
literature. For example, 28% of the participants did not agree that an incorrect surgical 
prep was an intraoperative nursing error. Most startling of all was the fact that 
approximately 21% did not agree that not knowing the patient’s allergies was an error, or 
that 22% did not choose the item, misidentifying a patient, as a nursing error. I may only 
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speculate that the items needed better clarification because these particular nursing 
actions are basic clinical competencies expected of all perioperative nurses. 
 Do you consider a close call the same as an error was the second question in the 
questionnaire. Several definitions exist for the term, close call, but one commonality 
among the definitions is that the patient becomes harmed if the close call results in an 
error. AORN, (n.d.) defines a close call as “events or situations that could have resulted 
in accident, injury or illness if left undetected” which suggests a delineation between 
error and close call. This definition, along with a definition for nursing error, was 
provided on the first page of the questionnaire. The respondents’ answers to this question 
indicated that many believed that a close call was the same as an error regardless of 
patient outcome (45%). It may be that education geared toward teaching nurses the 
correct terminology is needed to assist them in determining which events are clearly 
errors versus close calls, thus leading to proper recognition and reporting procedures.  
Research Question 2: What are the circumstances of intraoperative errors? 
 The second research question, What are the circumstances of intraoperative 
errors, encompassed both patient and nurse variables. Thirty-nine percent of respondents 
had more than 10 years of experience, and 28% had only 6 months to 2 years. Presently, 
there are no data available on the average years of experience for a perioperative 
registered nurse (K. Keene, personal communication, July 3, 2006) thus it was not 
possible to compare and determine whether or not the results of this study in regard to 
experience are representative of those registered nurses working in the OR.  
 Most of the patients (72%) were 18-64 years old, suggesting that a majority of the 
perioperative nurses worked with an adult population. All were able to answer how the 
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patient was affected after the error except for 7 participants, indicating that the outcome 
was determined before the patient left the operating room suite.  
 Determining from the data collected in this study which errors were not detected 
until the postoperative period generates additional questions. For example, a negative 
outcome from improper positioning is the development of a pressure ulcer. Lindgren, 
Unosson, Krantz, and Ek, (2005) found that 14.3% of patients in their study (n = 286) 
developed pressure ulcers postoperatively. Generally, perioperative nurses do not follow 
their patients once they leave the operating room making it improbable that the nurses 
would be able to report any negative outcomes post surgery unless it was brought to their 
attention. Further analysis of the data indicated that the errors occurred in many different 
surgical procedures although most took place during general surgery. Although no 
discernible pattern could be identified from this information, many open general surgical 
procedures are conducted through a large incision. In a study on retained sponges and 
instruments, Gawande et al. (2003) found that 54% of foreign bodies were left in the 
abdomen or pelvis.  
Research Question 3: What are the perceived causes of intraoperative nursing errors?
 According to the cognitive theory of psychological stress and coping by Lazarus 
and Folkman (1984), individuals use the process of cognitive appraisal in assessing a 
stressful encounter. For this study, the perioperative nurses identified what they believed 
to be causes of intraoperative nursing errors by using the primary and secondary 
cognitive appraisal process before deciding which coping strategies would best manage 
the aftermath of committing an error. Perceived causes of intraoperative nursing errors 
included personal reasons and external variables such as the operating room atmosphere, 
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and suggested that the perioperative nurses may have felt personally responsible for 
committing the error and may not have attributed external factors such as lack of 
appropriate supplies, inadequate supervision, improper orientation, or a defective system 
under which they worked as potential causes. It also appeared from the data that the 
perioperative nurses did not attribute memory lapses or acting beyond one’s competence 
as causes of their error.  
 These findings contradict the results of a study on causes of assessment omissions 
in the emergency room done by Meurier, Vincent, and Parmar (1998b) who found that 
the nurses tended to direct cause to external reasons such as stressful atmosphere, work 
overload, and too many nurses involved in the assessment. These findings support 
attribution theory which implies that individuals tend to blame others for failure 
(Meurier, et al., 1998a). 
 Differences in the findings of this study and the study by Meurier et al. (1998b) 
may be due to several factors. Meurier et al. suggested that the reasons the nurses 
directed cause to external factors may have been due to feelings of helplessness in 
conducting an accurate assessment and lack of control in regard to the patient’s care. The 
findings also called into question whether or not the nurses perceived assessment 
omissions as actual errors. In a study on reporting of medication errors, Baker (1997) 
found that nurses tended to redefine institutional definitions of what constituted a 
medication error through their own tacit understanding of the rules.  
 Perioperative nurses direct their care to one surgical patient at a time where as 
emergency room nurses may be caring for several patients. Perioperative nurses have 
more control over their environment and assume the role of the “circulator”. In this role, 
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they direct the care of the patient and meet the needs of the entire surgical team. Unlike 
the emergency room nurses who were not sure if assessment omissions were errors, the 
participants in this study were in agreement with the definitions of intraoperative nursing 
errors and as previously reported, directed the causes of error internally. The 
perioperative nurses took responsibility for their errors and did not project blame 
elsewhere.  
 The internal consistency scores were adequate for the subscales representing 
causes of error except for job overload (Cronbach’s alpha = .59). The poor internal 
consistency of this variable calls into question the reliability of the scale in measuring job 
overload and whether or not the items were perceived by the participants as defining job 
overload. Sixty-five percent of the participants disagreed strongly with the item, I was 
tired and 74% disagreed strongly with the item, I had a lapse of memory. These two 
items were included in the subscale of job overload and may not have been understood by 
the participants as representing job overload. The remaining two items included in the job 
overload subscale were, I was distracted, and I had too many things to do at once. More 
participants agreed somewhat or agreed strongly with these items suggesting that the 
items may have been more representative of job overload.   
Research Question 4: To what extent do perioperative nurses experience emotional 
distress after committing an intraoperative error? 
 
 I made no assumption as to the level of emotional distress, if any, felt by the 
participants after committing an error. One of the perioperative experts who reviewed the 
questionnaire for content validity suggested that the items reflect both socially desirable 
and undesirable responses. It was apparent from the data extracted from Question 4, To 
what extent do perioperative nurses experience emotional distress after committing an 
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intraoperative error, that the perioperative nurses felt a variety of emotions. A majority 
(87%) disagreed strongly to the item of feeling indifferent toward the experience, yet 
responses to the item, I believe that my actions were reasonable, were not as extreme. 
This finding suggested that most of the perioperative nurses experienced some level of 
emotional distress but may have considered their actions to be appropriate at the time 
considering the circumstances.   
 Seventy-three percent (n = 114) of the perioperative nurses were angry with 
themselves implying a strong tendency to internalize their feelings. Perioperative nurses 
tend to become angry with their self especially if they feel their level of expertise does 
not warrant making mistakes. This finding was similar to a study on errors in nursing 
practice in which 73% (n = 94) of the nurses felt angry with themselves (Meurier et al., 
1997). In addition to feelings of anger, 59% of the perioperative nurses felt guilty as a 
result of committing an error. Because patient safety is continuously stressed as 
paramount to what constitutes a “good nurse”, nurses may feel that they may have let 
their patients down if they committed an error. This may lead to feelings of guilt and self-
blame. In a study of nurses’ experiences with medication errors, Arndt (1994a) found that 
nurses felt guilty about causing patient harm as a result of their error. In addition, Meurier 
et al. (1998a) found in their study of causal attributions made by nurses after committing 
an error that nurses tended to blame themselves for an error especially if the error 
resulted in a serious negative patient outcome. Regardless, however, the nurses tended to 
take responsibility for their errors despite its severity. Nurses and other healthcare 
professionals are not expected to commit errors and this way of thinking becomes 
ingrained throughout the socialization process in many health professions (Leape, 1994). 
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 An additional finding of particular interest for this study on intraoperative nursing 
errors was that 60% of the nurses felt devastated that they may have hurt someone. 
Studies on the emotional toll felt by healthcare professionals after committing an error 
has shown that there may be lasting consequences for the practitioner. Wu et al. (1991) 
found that some physicians rejected careers in subspecialties after missing a diagnosis, 
and one house officer reported feeling very worrisome and nervous about clinical 
medicine after the mistake resulted in a patient death. High levels of emotional distress 
led some physicians to remember in detail errors they had committed several years prior 
to their participation in a study by Christensen et al. (1992).  
 In a secondary analysis of data of Christensen’s et al. (1992) study which 
examined the responses of healthcare providers on serious medication errors, Serembus, 
Wolf, and Youngblood (2001) sought additional insight into the consequences 
surrounding fatal medication errors. The participants were easily able to recall the 
experience and admitted to feelings of guilt and sadness. Committing the error had lasting 
lifestyle changes for the participants. The impact upon these participants included 
insomnia, job loss, and isolation from supportive co-workers and family members.  
 In this study, emotional distress was considered one of the adaptational outcomes 
as defined by the cognitive theory of psychological stress and coping (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984). As shown in this study, emotional distress was indeed a consequence of 
the coping process experienced by the perioperative nurses after they committed an error.  
Research Question 5: How do perioperative nurses cope with committing an 
intraoperative error?  
  
 In analyzing the results from question 5, How do perioperative nurses cope with 
committing an intraoperative error, negative coping strategies identified by the subscale 
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of distancing were not used by the majority of the perioperative nurses. A negative 
strategy such as, I went on as if nothing had happened, were not used by 79% of the 
sample. In addition, 75% of the participants did not use the strategy, I tried to forget the 
whole thing. Other evidence supporting the willingness of the respondents to use positive 
coping strategies was indicated by 58% of the sample that did not use escape-avoidance 
as a coping strategy from one item, I wished the situation would go away or somehow be 
over. In addition, 67% of the participants did not use the strategy of having fantasies of 
how things might turn out.  
 The nurses were purposeful in their actions following the error which is apparent 
by 35% of the sample who claimed to use the strategy, I made a plan of action and then 
followed it. Accepting responsibility was used a great deal by a number of respondents as 
evidence by their choosing the strategies of (a) I criticized or lectured myself (26%), (b) I 
promised to do things differently next time (48%), and (c) I apologized or did something 
to make up (20%). Even though 94% of nurses who committed an error talked with 
someone afterwards, 76% did not ask for advice from a relative or friend and 49% did not 
accept sympathy and understanding . These strategies were identified as seeking social 
support. These results are in contrast to the Meurier et al. (1997) study in which 25% of 
the respondents talked to someone about how they were feeling, 25% accepted sympathy 
and understanding from someone, and 18% asked a relative or friend they respected for 
advice.  
 Questions were asked of the participants about their interaction with managers 
following the error. If they did interact, the questions asked were categorized into the 
subscales of supportive and judgmental managerial responses. One of the more striking 
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findings of this study was that the participants felt the management staff was supportive 
and not judgmental in their responses. A majority of the nurses did not lose professional 
respect (70%), were not humiliated (52%), did not feel they were used as a scapegoat 
(79%), and felt supported for the way the case was handled (46%). 
 In contrast, Wolf, Seremus, Smetzer, Cohen, and Cohen (2000) found from the 
responses of nurses, physicians, and pharmacists in their study on medication errors that 
fear of punishment and disciplinary action were highly ranked as participant responses. A 
new graduate admitted feeling humiliated by a nurse manager while another participant 
questioned whether or not it was best to disclose the error because of the negative 
management responses. Worried about management reactions and not reporting an error 
due to fear of management reactions were two themes Gladstone (1995) identified from 
interviews with nurses who committed a medication error while practicing in a general 
acute care hospital in southwest England. The findings from this study on intraoperative 
nursing errors are promising in lieu of the past research and literature that reports a 
current healthcare culture known as punitive and non-supportive toward health team 
members that commit errors (Leape et al., 1998; Wolf & Serembus, 2004).  
  Due to the lack of access to the OR, it may be difficult to compare the managerial 
responses with those of other nursing units. It may be surmised that the managerial 
approach to OR errors is quite different from other nursing specialties or that the 
relationship between staff and management is more intimate and confidential. This 
difference may be attributed to several reasons. Because of the physical isolation of the 
OR, members of the surgical team including management tend to associate more with 
each other than other healthcare professionals. Access to the OR is restricted and gained 
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through locks, key codes, and identification badge entries. Frequently, the surgical team 
remains within the confines of the OR for breaks, lunch, and dinner periods. The 
perioperative nurses’ uniform is different from other nurses and wearing a mask and head 
cover contributes to a sense of anonymity and exclusivity.  
 Unlike other nursing specialties, OR nurses are required to take call, perform both 
scrub and circulating duties, operate sophisticated equipment, and use specialty 
instrumentation. Due to the nature of the specialty, perioperative nurses are not included 
in the general nurse population when it comes to annual clinical competencies, 
educational programs, and professional activities. These factors may contribute to self-
imposed feelings of segregation. As a result, errors committed in the OR may be handled 
without knowledge and interference from other departments. The surgical team may 
adopt a “take care of their own” mentality relating to issues within the OR. Further 
research is needed to uncover the underlying reasons why perioperative nurses in this 
study felt differently about how they were treated by the operating room management as 
compared with registered nurses working in areas other than the OR. 
Research Question 6: What is the relationship between coping with intraoperative 
nursing errors and changes in practice? 
  
 Multiple regression analysis was used to answer research question 6. Prior to this 
analysis, correlations were conducted on the independent variable subscales representing 
coping strategies with the dependent variables of constructive and defensive changes in 
practice. A moderate but significant relationship was shown between the coping strategy 
of planful problem solving with constructive changes in practice (r = .34, p = .000). In 
contrast, moderate and significant relationships were also shown between exercising the 
coping strategy of self-control with defensive changes in practice (r = .37, p = .000) and 
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accepting responsibility with defensive changes in practice (r = .35, p = .000). All three 
strategies were considered to be positive forms of coping. 
 A strong significant relationship was shown between the coping strategy known 
as escape-avoidance with defensive changes in practice (r = .52, p = .000). These results 
suggested that those perioperative nurses who used maladaptive ways of coping after 
committing an error changed their practice in more defensive ways. In addition, using 
coping strategies considered positive resulted in both constructive and defensive changes 
in practice. The remaining coping strategies showed somewhat weak relationships with 
constructive and defensive changes in practice. As a result of the correlation analyses, it 
cannot be inferred that using positive coping strategies led exclusively to constructive 
changes in practice.  
 Seeking social support, (   = .20, p < .05), and planful problem solving (   = .29, p 
< .001) were the only two coping strategies to emerge as significant predictors of 
constructive changes in practice. Collectively, all of the coping strategy variables 
accounted for 20% of the variance in the dependent variable of constructive changes in 
practice. Meurier et al. (1997) found in their study with British ward nurses that the 
coping strategy variables showed more power in predicting constructive changes in 
practice (R2 = .43).  
 Additional analysis of this study indicated that the positive coping strategy, 
accepting responsibility for the error was a significant predictor for defensive changes in 
practice (   = .17, p < .05).  This finding suggested that although the perioperative nurses 
held themselves accountable for the error, they adopted some defensive changes 
identified by the items in the questionnaire as (a) I feel less confident in my work, (b) I 
   
    
92 
get more worried, and (c) I am less trusting of others’ capability. The coping strategy of 
self-control (   = .17, p < .05) was equally predictive of defensive changes in practice. 
The most predictive of defensive changes in practice was the coping strategy of escape-
avoidance (   = .35, p < .001). The total R2 for this model explained 33% of the variance 
in the dependent variable of defensive changes in practice. Interpretation of these 
findings indicates that both positive and negative coping strategies were predictors of 
defensive changes in practice. These are not in disagreement with other studies on 
coping. Folkman and Moskowitz (2004) stated that emotion- and problem-focused forms 
of coping have been associated with negative, or positive outcomes, or neither. One 
method of coping can have a positive effect on one outcome and a negative impact on 
another. The outcomes depend upon how the individual appraises the stressful encounter 
and the characteristics affiliated with the event.  
Research Question 7: What is the relationship between coping with intraoperative 
nursing errors and emotional distress? 
  
 A strong significant relationship was shown between the coping strategy of 
accepting responsibility with emotional distress (r = .55, p = .000). Moderate, yet 
significant, relationships were found between emotional distress and the strategies of self-
control (r = .47, p = .000) and escape-avoidance (r = .48, p = .000). Although statistically 
significant, less robust relationships occurred between emotional distress and seeking 
social support (r = .28, p = .000), and planful problem solving (r = .22, p = .000). It 
appears from the data that using both negative and positive forms of coping may 
influence some level of emotional distress. The relationship between accepting 
responsibility and emotional distress was also shown in two previous studies on errors 
(Meurier et al., 1997; Wu et al., 1991). The coping strategy of distancing was the lone 
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variable not shown to influence emotional distress in this study. Descriptive statistical 
analysis indicated that a large percentage of the perioperative nurses did not use the 
coping strategy of distancing. This implies that the perioperative nurses in this sample 
recognized the problem of committing an error and chose to deal with it head on as 
opposed to deliberately putting the experience out of their minds.  
 Determining whether or not a particular coping strategy is positive or negative 
depends upon the context of the situation. It may be inferred that the perioperative nurses 
chose to use both types of strategies according to their own interpretations of the stressful 
experience of committing an error. The type of stressful event and the circumstances 
surrounding it may determine whether or not one coping strategy is more effective than 
another at a given point in time.  
 Participants used the coping strategies of accepting responsibility (   = .34, p < 
.001), and using self control (   = .17, p < .05) which were found to be significant 
predictors of emotional distress. Wu et al. (1991) studied how house officers reacted to 
medical errors and also found accepting responsibility to be a significant predictor of 
emotional distress (   = .67, p = .0001). The findings suggest that while nurses may 
readily accept responsibility for errors and not blame others, the distress they encounter is 
real and needs to be recognized by managers and dealt with in a sensitive manner. The 
aftermath of the error may be as stressful as the error itself.  
 The results of the analysis of data relative to research questions 5, 6, and 7 
supported the theory of psychological stress and coping and showed that coping strategies 
are used by individuals to mediate the relationship between stressful occurrences and 
adaptational outcomes (Folkman et al., 1986). A shortened version of Folkman and 
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Lazarus’s (1985) Ways of Coping measured coping strategies used by the perioperative 
nurses after committing an error. The participants believed that committing an error was 
relevant to their well-being and needed to use problem-focused strategies such as planful 
problem solving coupled with emotion-focused strategies including accepting 
responsibility, escape-avoidance, and self-control as a way to manage the feelings 
associated with committing an error. Outcomes were diverse depending upon which 
strategies were used. For example, those perioperative nurses who used the coping 
strategy of accepting responsibility had emotional distress as well as constructive changes 
in practice.   
Additional Analysis 
 Additional analyses of data were conducted to determine the relationships 
between the independent variable subscales representing causes of intraoperative nursing 
errors and managerial responses with the dependent variables of constructive and 
defensive changes in practice and emotional distress. Moderately strong significant 
relationships were found between a lack of supervision and defensive changes in practice 
(r = .45, p = .000) and a lack of supervision and emotional distress (r = .41, p = .000). 
Although the relationships were statistically significant at <.001, the magnitude of the 
relationships were weak between inexperience and faulty judgment on the part of the 
nurses and level of emotional distress and changes in practice. If the participants believed 
that inadequate supervision contributed to the error, they were more likely to report 
defensive changes in practice and higher levels of emotional distress.   
 No relationships were detected between job overload and the dependent variables 
including emotional distress and changes in practice. This finding is in contrast to the 
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study by Meurier et al. (1997) whereby nurses who chose inexperience and job overload 
as causes of error reported more constructive changes in practice and higher levels of 
emotional distress. A question arises as to whether or not the low internal consistency 
score for the job overload subscale (Chronbach’s alpha = .59) had an effect on the 
correlation scores. This may have been due to two items in the subscale not being 
representative of job overload. It is suggested that the subscale be re-evaluated in terms 
of whether or not the items adequately represent the concept of job overload.  
 The strongest relationship was found between the cause of lack of supervision and 
defensive changes in practice and emotional distress. The participants who had less 
perioperative nursing experience may have felt inadequately supervised especially if they 
lacked sufficient training. Because of the current nursing shortage, many novice 
perioperative nurses are expected to practice independently after a limited orientation 
period. The remaining relationships were similar in regard to significance and Pearson 
product moment correlation (r) scores. The results signify multi-factorial causes of error. 
 Although a weak but significant  relationship was found between  judgmental 
managerial responses and constructive changes in practice (r = .22, p = .02) a  strong 
significant relationship was shown between  judgmental managerial responses and 
defensive changes in practice (r = .56, p = .000). A significant negative relationship was 
also found between  supportive managerial responses and defensive changes in practice (r 
= -.33, p = .000). These findings indicate that the more supportive the nurses felt by 
management after committing an error, the less likely they were to adopt defensive 
changes in practice.  
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 A negative relationship was also shown between supportive managerial responses 
and emotional distress but was not statistically significant. A statistically significant 
relationship did however exist between judgmental responses and emotional distress (r = 
.36, p = .000). These results are positive reminders that a non-punitive environment 
encourages healthcare professionals to learn from their errors and adopt constructive 
changes while reproachable methods do little to address the practice and/or the needs of 
the practitioner.  
  In summary, over half of the participants in this study (58%) identified 
themselves as having committed an intraoperative nursing error. Those who committed 
an error used a variety of coping strategies. Strong relationships were evident between 
certain coping strategies and the adaptational outcomes of changes in practice and 
emotional distress. In particular, those perioperative nurses who accepted responsibility 
for committing an error and exercised self-control experienced higher levels of emotional 
distress. The perioperative nurses who coped by using the escape and/or avoidance 
strategy were found to have more defensive changes in practice. Six of the eight original 
coping scales as identified by Lazarus and Folkman (1984) were used to evaluate the 
participants’ reactions and responses to intraoperative nursing errors. The results 
illustrated the complex nature of coping whereby individuals who are faced with stressful 
events must be prepared to mediate its impact through various strategies. The 
participants’ level of emotions reflected the psychological impact imposed upon them as 
they navigated through the public and private journey of committing an error.
   
 97   
 
V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 This chapter begins with the summary and conclusions of this research study on 
intraoperative nursing errors. Limitations of the study are presented followed by 
recommendations for future research and implications for nursing practice and nursing 
research. 
A. Summary and Conclusions 
 The aims of this study were specific to learning about how nurses defined 
intraoperative nursing errors, what they perceived to be causes of the errors, and how 
they coped after committing an error. The purposes of this study were to: 1) examine the 
definitions, circumstances, causes, and reactions of perioperative nurses to intraoperative 
nursing errors; and 2) examine the relationships among coping with intraoperative 
nursing errors, emotional distress, and changes in practice.  
 The conceptual framework that guided this study was the cognitive theory of 
psychological stress and coping (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).The act of committing an 
intraoperative nursing error was the stressful event experienced by the perioperative 
nurses. Through primary and secondary cognitive appraisal processes, their responses to 
committing an error were grounded in both emotion and problem focused forms of 
coping. The adaptational outcomes resulting from the various coping processes were 
levels of emotional distress, and constructive and defensive changes in practice.  
 The research design for this study was a descriptive, correlational design. After 
receiving approval from the Duquesne University Institutional Review Board, the sample
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participants were randomly chosen from a list of perioperative registered nurses who 
were members of AORN at the time of this study. Strict confidentiality and anonymity of 
the participants was maintained. Accounting for a 27% response rate, a total of 700 
members were contacted three times via mail over the course of several weeks. A total of 
272 questionnaires were returned resulting in a 39% response rate.   
 This research study was the first known to examine perioperative nurses in 
regards to how they defined intraoperative nursing errors. Descriptive statistics were 
reported on the entire study sample (N = 272) in the categories of demographics and 
responses to the question on definitions of intraoperative nursing errors and close call. 
Those that were found to have committed intraoperative nursing errors (n = 158) were 
asked further questions related to causes of the error, how the experience affected their 
ability to cope, and whether or not any particular types of coping strategies led to 
emotional distress and changes in clinical practice. In addition, this study was the first to 
use the conceptual framework of Lazarus and Folkman’s theory of cognitive 
psychological stress and coping as a basis to research the impact of errors on 
perioperative nurses. Preliminary analysis was conducted on the data to meet the 
assumptions of the statistical tests. Analyses and major findings were categorized 
according to each research question.  
 Demographic findings supported the current information regarding the population 
of perioperative nurses except for level of education. In this study, a greater number of 
perioperative nurses were educated at the baccalaureate degree level rather than the 
associate degree level. Currently, statistical reports show that more nurses are educated at 
the associate degree level (United States Department of Health and Human Services, 
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2004). These findings may be attributed to an increase in professional incentives to 
pursue a baccalaureate degree such as scholarships, tuition reimbursements from hiring 
institutions, and clinical ladder models that require certain degrees for advancement. 
AORN, the professional organization of perioperative registered nurses, is proactive in 
promoting the baccalaureate degree and has a position statement on entry into practice 
(AORN, 2006). AORN members reaffirmed this statement in the 2005 House of 
Delegates during the annual AORN Congress. Support from the organization and its 
membership may have been an additional catalyst for several nurses pursuing a 
baccalaureate degree. The average age of the perioperative nurse was 47 years supporting 
the sobering fact of a “graying” workforce of practicing nurses in the United States. 
Additional demographic data was gathered such as gender, marital status, race/ethnicity, 
work position and certification, thus adding to the profile of the perioperative nurse.  
 The tool for this study, Perioperative Nurse Questionnaire, was a revised version 
of a questionnaire used in two previous studies with different populations (Meurier et al., 
1997; Wu et al., 1991) that examined the relationships among coping strategies, 
emotional distress, and changes in practice due to an error. Prior to this study on 
intraoperative nursing errors, a pilot study was conducted to assess the stability of the 
questionnaire using a test-retest method. Spearman
 
rank correlation coefficient
 
analysis 
was conducted on the items relating to definitions, circumstances, causes, reactions, 
coping, managerial responses, and changes in practices associated with errors. 
Coefficient values ranged from .29 to .98 across all items. Upon completion of the pilot 
study, several revisions were made to the questionnaire including a change in title. The 
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instrument was renamed, Perioperative Nurse Questionnaire, to better reflect the content 
and the target population.   
Similar findings were found with the two previous studies that used the same tool, 
as well as new information specific to the perioperative nurse population. For example, a 
strong, statistically significant relationship was found in all three studies between high 
levels of emotional distress and the coping strategy known as accepting responsibility. 
Through the use of multiple regression techniques used in this study, the coping strategy 
subscales were found to be significant predictors of emotional distress accounting for 
47% of the variance in the dependent variable. These results suggested that the emotional 
toil of committing an error crosses all boundaries of distinct healthcare professions, 
therefore the solutions developed for managing healthcare errors should address the 
needs of the practitioner as well as the patient. Although patient outcomes are the focus 
of nursing practice, the health of the practitioner cannot be ignored. It is important for 
healthcare leaders to be responsive to the needs of the practitioner in the aftermath of 
committing an error. This insight may prove beneficial by sensitizing the leaders to the 
problems faced by practitioners. Programs may be developed such as debriefing or crisis 
counseling sessions where learning from the error is more educative than disciplinary. 
One of the more striking findings of this study was that the participants found the 
managerial response to be very supportive as opposed to reactions characterized in the 
literature as punishing, humiliating, and demeaning. Because of a lack of research in the 
perioperative specialty, the current literature reflects studies on nurses who practice 
outside of the OR. It may be that OR management personnel are beginning to take note of 
the continuing research into the actions of healthcare institutions and how those actions 
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translate into either curtailing error rates with supportive actions or driving error 
reporting further underground with punitive actions. Within the specific perioperative 
context relative to this study, it may be that the closed environment of the operating room 
where the management and staff work closer together and are more aware of each other’s 
challenges and responsibilities accounted for this finding. All intraoperative activities are 
conducted behind closed doors away from the scrutiny of other healthcare workers and 
visitors. Surgical specialties such as cardiac, orthopedic, and neurosurgery routinely have 
specific teams that work with specific surgeons. This close knit group of perioperative 
nurses has been known to band together and support one another through difficult 
experiences.  
Multiple regression analysis was conducted on the independent coping variables 
with the dependent variables of constructive and defensive changes in practice. The 
coping variables accounted for 20% of the variance in constructive changes in practice 
and 33% of the variance in defensive changes in practice. The findings demonstrated that 
perioperative nurses react to committing an error similarly to other healthcare 
professionals. The error changed the way they practiced based upon which coping 
strategies were used to manage the stressful event.  
Additional correlational analysis was done on the data to assess the relationships 
between reactions by the management and emotional distress and changes in practices. A 
strong and statistically significant relationship was shown between a judgmental response 
on the part of the manager and defensive changes in practice and emotional distress. A 
significant negative relationship between managerial support and defensive changes in 
practice was also shown. The findings indicate the need to educate managers as to the 
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best approach when discussing errors with staff members. How nurses perceive the 
reaction by management will have an effect on their learning from the error as well as 
how to prevent future errors.  
 In conclusion, this study provided valuable and important information in regard to 
intraoperative errors from the nurses’ perspective. A main tenet of research is that 
answers provide a path toward more questions. In the review of the literature, it was 
apparent that a significant gap continues to exist in research of nursing errors specific to 
the surgical context. Little research has been conducted on how the impact of committing 
an error affects a perioperative nurse’s future practice and emotional well-being. This 
research on intraoperative nursing errors should be considered one small step in cracking 
open the door to the hidden world of perioperative nursing. This research study added to 
the body of nursing literature on the exposed topic of healthcare errors and revealed the 
hidden thoughts and beliefs of a mostly unknown specialty nurse population. 
B. Limitations of the Study 
Only those perioperative nurses who were members of AORN were contacted to 
participate. This restriction limited the access to other perioperative nurses who were not 
members of AORN at the time of the study. Although AORN has a large membership, 
there are perioperative nurses in practice who are not members, therefore, the results of 
this study can not be generalized to all perioperative nurses but rather those perioperative 
nurses who are also members of AORN. 
Reliability and content validity of the instrument, Perioperative Nurse 
Questionnaire, was evaluated in this study as well as the pilot study. A panel of six 
perioperative experts was contacted to evaluate the items in the questionnaire specifically 
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related to the intraoperative environment. The stability of the questionnaire in the pilot 
study was established by using Spearman
 
rank correlation coefficient
 
analysis. Reliability 
for the questionnaire used in this study was conducted on the variable subscales identified 
as causes of error, coping strategies, managerial responses, and constructive and 
defensive changes in practice. Internal consistency scores for the subscales were 
evaluated and measured by Cronbach’s alpha. The range of scores for the coping strategy 
subscales ranged from .50 to .73. Scores for the managerial response subscales ranged 
from .31 to .81, and the causes of error subscales ranged from .59 to .70. The relative lack 
of internal consistency for the causes of error subscales identified as job overload, and the 
coping strategy subscales identified as escape/avoidance and planful problem solving led 
to a reduced sense of confidence in the reliability of the items representing the subscales. 
 I believe that an additional question should have been asked of the participants in 
regard to the actual type of nursing error committed. This information may have proved 
valuable and the data would have added another dimension to the results. The first 
question in the survey asked the participants to rate items that were identified as 
definitions of nursing errors by the researcher. It would have been interesting to have 
compared and contrasted the definitions chosen by the researcher with actual errors 
committed by the participants.  
C. Recommendations 
Recommendations for Future Research 
  It would be beneficial to replicate this study in the hope of increasing the 
reliability and validity of the tool while further analyzing the data of a different sample 
from the same population. Revisions to the tool are needed before replication can occur. 
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The subscales with low internal consistency scores should be reviewed to determine if the 
items represented the concepts in a meaningful way. Expanding the sample to include 
perioperative nurses who are not members of AORN may increase the ability to 
generalize the results to the larger population. Incorporating errors from the preoperative 
as well as the intraoperative phases of perioperative nursing may provide additional 
information and expose errors outside the actual surgical suite. The perioperative nursing 
assessment begins in the preoperative phase and includes identifying the patient, 
verifying the surgical procedure, and checking that all pertinent information is in the 
patient’s chart. The atmosphere in the preoperative area is hurried especially during the 
beginning of the surgery schedule. The area is often crowded with healthcare 
professionals and visitors. Time is a major factor in the smooth operation of surgical 
services, and surgical start times are a major benchmark utilized by managers related to 
efficiency. These variables may contribute to an environment that is vulnerable to errors.  
 Because of the nature of the topics studied, further research in the area of 
perioperative nursing errors may be approached from a qualitative perspective to explore 
a more personalized account of the experience. Qualitative data is gathered through 
interviews, field notes, and self-reports. Providing a less structured format may encourage 
perioperative nurses to tell their stories in a more detailed manner.  
 The process as outlined by Salant and Dillman (1994) for survey development 
was followed in order to attract as many participants as possible, reduce the amount of 
missing data, and facilitate ease by which the participants could complete the 
questionnaire. This method uses the traditional form of regular mail to contact the 
participants. As more individuals use the internet as a primary form of communication, it 
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may be worthwhile to consider recruiting subjects via the internet and allow the 
participants to complete the questionnaire online. This method may increase the sample 
size and give access to perioperative nurses who are not members of AORN.  
 I recommend that future research on this topic focus on interventions designed to 
support the practitioner through the various phases of error management. In addition, 
further research should explore the connections between team functionality in the 
operating room and errors.  
Implications for Nursing Practice and Nursing Research 
 It was apparent from the results that the participants experienced a variety of 
emotions after committing an error which led to alterations in the way they practiced. The 
errors were not easily forgotten and many of the perioperative nurses harbored feelings of 
guilt, anger with themselves, and fear associated with causing harm to their patients. It is 
recommended that policies and procedures be designed to ensure that all nurses, 
regardless of specialty, be given clear guidelines on what constitutes a nursing error as 
well as the process for reporting an error. Nurses should feel comfortable in reporting 
errors and believe that their well-being will be considered during the process of the error 
investigation. It is recommended that the lingering emotional aspects felt by healthcare 
professionals be recognized and given proper attention by those who are responsible for 
dissecting the reasons behind the error. Further recommendations include establishing a 
debriefing team similar to those used in emergency nursing. Practitioners who commit 
errors should be able to discuss the experience in sessions led by specially trained 
professionals.  
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 The results of this study seemed to indicate that perioperative nurses are not clear 
on the definitions of intraoperative nursing errors. It is imperative that perioperative 
nurses have a precise understanding of what constitutes an error, if indeed management, 
expects errors to be reported. Thus, this research has many implications for nursing 
practice and nursing research. Continued research into perioperative nursing errors is 
needed to develop a taxonomy that defines nursing errors. The classification of what 
constitutes an error will provide a systemized and coded data base that practitioners, 
administrators, and researchers can use as a resource. It is difficult to find a solution for 
an error if the error has not been identified as such. The taxonomy could be incorporated 
into the perioperative nursing data set which is a structured vocabulary specific to 
perioperative nursing (Beyea, 2002). 
In today’s healthcare environment, errors are a reality. To recognize and accept 
the fact that nurses and other healthcare professionals commit errors is a difficult task for 
everyone involved including practitioners, patients, and the general public. Admitting 
that errors exist in healthcare is the first step in carving the way for investigations and 
solutions into this disturbing trend. The inadequacies of the system, individual 
practitioner responsibility, and standardized practices are three areas that need to be 
addressed in order to reduce error incidence and improve the quality of patient care. 
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Appendix A 
Ways of Coping Scales 
SET #1 (Community Sample) 
 
 From:  Folkman, S., Lazarus, R. S., Dunkel-Schetter, C., DeLongis, A., & Gruen, 
R. (1986). The dynamics of a stressful encounter: Cognitive appraisal, coping and 
encounter outcomes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 992-1003. 
 
 
 
Seventy-five married couples were interviewed in their homes once a month for five 
months. Husbands and wives were interviewed separately by different interviewers. 
Subjects were asked to describe the most stressful encounter they had experienced in the 
previous week and then fill out the revised Ways of Coping. The instructions were: 
“Please read each item below and indicate, by circling the appropriate category, to what 
extent you used it in the situation you have just described. 
 
Observations from the five interviews were pooled. The Ways of Coping items were 
analyzed using alpha and principal factoring with oblique rotation. Oblique rotation was 
chosen because, from a theoretical perspective, we expect people to chose from a vast 
array of coping strategies rather than to use one set of strategies to the exclusion of 
others. Past research on coping supports this model (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980). Three 
separate factor analyses were completed using different strategies for combining person-
occasions, or observations. First, analyses were conducted on the entire 750 observations, 
5 from each 150 subjects, where each of the five concerned a different stressful 
encounter. Second, 150 stressful encounters (one per subject) were randomly selected 
from the 750, equally representing each of the 5 occasions. An additional sample of 150 
stressful encounters was also randomly selected from the 750 total encounters without 
replacement of the prior 150 encounters, again, equally representing each of the five 
occasions. 
 
The three factor analyses yielded very similar factor patterns. Thirty-seven items 
consistently loaded high on the same factor across all 3 analyses. Twenty-two items 
loaded on the same factor fairly consistently; 9 of these were eliminated on the basis of 
marginal factor loadings or lack of conceptual coherence with their scale. Seven items did 
not consistently load on any factor and were therefore eliminated. Because multiple 
factorings had been conducted, we had several estimates of each item’s factor loading. A 
final principle factor analysis, calling for eight factors, was therefore performed on the 
750 observations with the final 50 items in order to get an estimate of each item’s factor 
loading. 
 
The coping scales derived from the factor analytic procedures described above, their 
alphas, and factor loadings for the items are shown in Table 1. The eight scales accounted 
for 46.2% of the variance. 
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Table 1 
 
Empirically constructed Scales from the WAYS OF COPING (Revised) 
(Community Sample) 
 
 
To score the scales, sum ratings for each scale.                                                      Factor 
                                                                                                                                Loading 
Scale 1: Confrontive coping (alpha = .70) 
 
46. Stood my ground and fought for what I wanted.   .70 
  7. Tried to get the person responsible to change his or her mind.   .62 
17. I expressed anger to the person(s) who caused the problem   .61 
28. I let my feelings out somehow.   .58 
34. Took a big chance or did something very risky.   .32 
  6. I did something which I didn’t think would work, but at least 
      I was doing something   .30 
 
Scale 2: Distancing (alpha = .61) 
 
44.  Made light of the situation; refused to get too serious about it.   .55 
13.  Went on as if nothing had happened.   .54 
41.  Didn’t let it get to me; refused to think too much about it.         .50 
21.  Tried to forget the whole thing.             .49  
15. Looked for the silver lining, so to speak; tried to look on the  
       bright side of things.   .34 
12.  Went along with fate; sometimes I just have bad luck.   .25 
 
Scale 3: Self-controlling (alpha = .70) 
 
14.  I tried to keep my feelings to myself.   .55 
43.  Kept others from knowing how bad things were.   .46 
10.  Tried not to burn my bridges, but leave things open somewhat.   .40  
35.  I tried not to act too hastily or follow my first hunch.   .40 
54.  I tried to keep my feelings from interfering with other things too much.    .37  
63. I thought about how a person I admire would handle this situation and  
       used that as a model.   .37 
64.  I tried to see things from the other person’s point of view.    .28 
    
 Scale 4: Seeking social support (alpha = .76) 
 
  8.  Talked to someone to find out more about the situation.   .73 
31.  Talked to someone who could do something concrete about the problem.    .68 
42.  I asked a relative or friend I respected for advice.   .58 
45.  Talked to someone about how I was feeling.   .57 
18.  Accepted sympathy and understanding from someone.   .56 
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22.  I got professional help.   .45 
 
Scale 5: Accepting responsibility (alpha = .66) 
 
  9.  Criticized or lectured myself.   .71 
29.  Realized I brought the problem on myself.   .68 
51.  I made a promise to myself that things would be different next time.   .49 
25.  I apologized or did something to make up.   .39 
 
Scale 6: Escape-Avoidance (alpha = .72) 
 
58.  Wished that the situation would go away or somehow be over with.   .66 
11.  Hoped a miracle would happen.   .55 
59.  Had fantasies or wishes about how things might turn out.   .54 
33. Tried to make myself feel better by eating, drinking, smoking, using  
       drugs or medication, etc.   .49 
40. Avoided being with people in general.    .46 
50.  Refused to believe that it had happened.   .42  
47.  Took it out on other people.   .40  
16.  Slept more than usual.   .36 
 
Scale 7: Planful problem-solving (alpha = .68) 
 
49.  I knew what had to be done, so I doubled my efforts to make things work.    .71 
26.  I made a plan of action and followed it.   .61 
1.  Just concentrated on what I had to do next – the next step.   .45  
39.  Changed something so things would turn out all right.   .44 
48.  Drew on my past experiences; I was in a similar situation before.   .40 
52.  Came up wit a couple of different solutions to the problem.   .38 
 
Scale 8: Positive reappraisal (alpha = .79) 
 
23. Changed or grew as a person in a good way.   .79 
30.  I came out of the experience better than when I went in.         .67 
36. Found new faith.   .64 
38.  Rediscovered what is important in life.            .64 
60.  I prayed.                .56 
56. I changed something about myself.   .55 
20.  I was inspired to do something creative.            .43 
 
 
The inter-correlations among the coping scales averaged over 5 occasions are shown in 
Table 2. 
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Table 2 
 
Eight Coping Scales: 
Intercorrelations Averaged Over Five Occasions 
 
 
  Scale 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
 
1. Confrontive coping   .01  .36  .27  .26  .27  .28  .26 
2. Distancing    .36  -.04  .27  .32  .09  .13 
3. Self-controlling     .24  .30  .36  .37  .39 
4. Seeking social support     .09  .23  .30  .32 
5. Accepting responsibility      .39  .13  .18 
6. Escape-avoidance        .10  .23 
7. Planful problem-solving        .39 
8. Positive reappraisal         --- 
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WAYS OF COPING SCALES 
SET #2 (Student Sample) 
 
From: Folkman, S. & Lazarus, R. S. (1985). If it changes it must be a process: Study of 
emotion and coping during three stages of a college examination. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 48, 150-170. 
 
Data were gathered from 108 undergraduates who completed the Ways of Coping 
(Folkman & Lazarus, 1985) three times as part of a study of examination stress. 
Observations from the three occasions were pooled. Nine items were eliminated from 
analysis because they showed high skewness and restricted variance. The remaining 57 
items were submitted to common factor analysis with oblique rotation. A six factor 
solution yielded the most conceptually interpretable set of factors. Fifteen items that did 
not load clearly on any one factor were deleted. One of the six factors contained three 
distinguishable groups of items. The three groups were rationally assigned to three 
factors to provide greater theoretical clarity. The procedure produced eight scales, 
including one problem-focused and six emotion focused scales, and an eighth scale 
containing both problem and emotion focused items. The scales and the factor loadings 
for the five empirically constructed scales, and alphas for all eight scales, are shown in 
Table 3. The inter-correlations among the scales averaged over three occasions are shown 
in Table 4. 
 
Table 3  
 
Empirically and Rationally Constructed Scales from the WAYS OF COPING (Revised)* 
(Student Sample) 
 
Empirically Constructed Scales 
 
To score the scales, sum ratings for each scale.                                                    Factor 
                                                                                                                               Loading 
Scale 1: Problem-focused coping (alpha = .88) 
 
62.  I go over in my mind what I will say or do.   .72 
46.  Stand my ground and fight for what I want.   .62 
49.  I know what has to be done, so I am doubling my efforts to make things work.   .67 
52.  Come up with a couple of different solutions to the problem.   .67 
35.  I try not to act too hastily or follow my first hunch.   .66 
26.  I’m making a plan of action and following it.   .64 
64.  I try to see things from the other person’s point of view.   .61 
54.  I try to keep my feelings from interfering with other things too much.   .60 
39.  Change something so things will turn out all right.   .59 
  2.  I try to analyze the problem in order to understand it better.   .54 
48.  Draw on my past experiences; I was in a similar situation before.   .52 
 
• NOTE: IN THIS STUDY ITEMS WERE DELIBERATELY PUT IN THE PRESENT TENSE 
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Scale 2: Wishful thinking (alpha = .86)   
 
55.  Wish that I can change what is happening or how I feel. .78 
  
58.  Wish that the situation would go away or somehow be over with. .70 
  
57.  I daydream or imagine a better time or place than the one I am in. .67 
 
59.  Have fantasies or wishes about how things might turn out. .65 
 
11.  Hope a miracle will happen. .61 
 
Scale 3: Detachment (alpha = .74) 
 
21.  Try to forget the whole thing. .61 
 
13.  Go on as if nothing is happening. .58 
 
24.  I’m waiting to see what will happen before doing anything. .54 
 
12.  Go along with fate; sometimes I just have bad luck. .52 
  
 4.  I feel that time will make a difference – the only thing to do is to wait. .51 
 
53.  Accept it, since nothing can be done. .51 
 
Scale 4: Seeking social support (alpha = .82) 
 
45.  Talk to someone about how I’m feeling. .71 
 
18.  Accept sympathy and understanding from someone. .67 
 
28.  I let my feelings out somehow. .62 
 
31.  Talk to someone who can do something concrete about the problem. .58 
  
 8.  Talk to someone to find out more about the situation. .54 
 
42.  Ask a relative or friend I respect for advice. .53 
 
60.  I pray. .49 
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Scale 5: Focusing on the positive (alpha = .70) 
 
23.  I’m changing or growing as a person in a good way. .72 
 
38.  Rediscover what is important in life. .59 
 
20.  I am inspired to do something creative. .48 
 
15.  Look for the silver lining, so to speak; try to look on the bright side of things.    .47 
Rationally Created Scales 
 
Scale 6: Self blame (alpha = .76) 
 
  9.  Criticize or lecture myself.  
29. Realize I brought the problem on myself. 
51. Make a promise to myself that things will be different next time. 
 
Scale 7: Tension reduction (alpha = .59) 
 
32. Got away from it for a while; tried to rest or take a vacation. 
33. Try to make myself feel better by eating, drinking, smoking, using drugs or           
medication, etc. 
66. I jog or exercise. 
 
Scale 8: Keep to self (alpha = .65) 
 
14.  I try to keep my feelings to myself. 
40.  Avoid being with people in general. 
43. Keep others from knowing how bad things are. 
 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Eight Coping Scales: 
Intercorrelations Averaged Over Three Occasions 
 
 
  Scale 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
 
1.  Problem focused coping .41 .20 .64 .58 .46 .38 .31 
2.  Wishful thinking   .51 .42 .29 .63 .50 .54 
3. Distancing    .24 .13 .34 .34 .41 
4. Seeking social support     .54 .39 .42 .18 
   
    
114 
 
5. Emphasizing the positive      .42 .36 .23 
6. Self blame        .31 .53 
7. Tension reduction         .37 
8. Self isolation         --- 
 
 
WAYS OF COPING (Revised) 
 
Please read each item below and indicate, by using the following rating scale, to what 
extent you used it in the situation you have just described. 
 
Not   Used    Used   Used 
Used                     Somewhat                 Quite A Bit                  A great deal 
 
   0       1        2           3 
 
_____ 1.  Just concentrated on what I had to do next – the next step. 
 
_____ 2.  I  tried to analyze the problem in order to understand it better. 
 
_____  3.  Turned to work or substitute activity to take my mind off things. 
 
_____  4.  I felt that time would make a difference – the only thing to do was to wait. 
 
_____  5.  Bargained or compromised to get something positive from the situation. 
 
_____  6.  I did something which I didn’t think would work, but at least I was doing 
      something. 
 
_____  7.  Tried to get the person responsible to change his or her mind. 
 
_____  8.  Talked to someone to find out more about the situation. 
 
_____  9.  Criticized or lectured myself. 
 
_____ 10.  Tried not to burn my bridges, but leave things open somewhat. 
 
_____ 11.  Hoped a miracle would happen. 
 
_____ 12.  Went along with fate; sometimes I just have bad luck. 
 
_____ 13.  Went on as if nothing had happened. 
 
_____ 14.  I tried to keep my feelings to myself. 
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_____ 15.  Looked for the silver lining, so to speak; tried to look on the bright side of  
       things. 
 
_____ 16.  Slept more than usual. 
 
_____ 17.  I expressed anger to the person(s) who caused the problem. 
 
 
Not   Used    Used   Used 
Used                     Somewhat                 Quite A Bit                  A great deal 
 
   0       1        2           3 
 
 
_____ 18.  Accepted sympathy and understanding from someone. 
 
_____ 19.  I told myself things that helped me to feel better. 
 
_____ 20.  I was inspired to do something creative. 
 
_____ 21.  Tried to forget the whole thing. 
 
_____ 22.  I got professional help. 
 
_____ 23.  Changed or grew as a person in a good way. 
 
_____ 24.  I waited to see what would happen before doing anything. 
 
_____ 25.  I apologized or did something to make up. 
 
_____ 26.  I made a plan of action and followed it. 
 
_____ 27.  I accepted the next best thing to what I wanted. 
 
_____ 28.  I let my feelings out somehow. 
 
_____ 29.  Realized I brought the problem on myself. 
 
_____ 30.  I came out of the experience better than when I went in. 
 
_____ 31.  Talked to someone who could do something concrete about the problem. 
 
_____ 32.  Got away from it for a while; tried to rest or take a vacation. 
 
_____ 33.  Tried to make myself feel better by eating, drinking, smoking, using drugs or  
      medication, etc. 
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_____ 34.  Took a big chance or did something very risky. 
 
_____ 35.  I tried not to act too hastily or follow my first hunch. 
 
_____ 36.  Found new faith. 
 
_____ 37.  Maintained my pride and kept a stiff upper lip. 
 
Not   Used    Used   Used 
Used                     Somewhat                 Quite A Bit                  A great deal 
 
   0       1        2           3 
 
_____ 38.  Rediscovered what is important in life. 
  
_____ 39.  Changed something so things would turn out all right. 
 
_____ 40.  Avoided being with people in general. 
 
_____ 41.  Didn’t let it get to me; refused to think too much about it. 
 
_____ 42.  I asked a relative or friend I respected for advice. 
 
_____ 43.  Kept others from knowing how bad things were. 
 
_____ 44.  Made light of the situation; refused to get too serious about it. 
 
_____ 45.  Talked to someone about how I was feeling. 
 
_____ 46.  Stood my ground and fought for what I wanted. 
 
_____ 47.  Took it out on other people. 
 
_____ 48.  Drew on my past experiences; I was in a similar situation before. 
 
_____ 49.  I knew what had to be done, so I doubled my efforts to make things work. 
 
_____ 50.  Refused to believe that it had happened. 
 
_____ 51.  I made a promise to myself that things would be different next time. 
 
_____ 52.  Came up with a couple of different solutions to the problem. 
 
_____ 53.  Accepted it, since nothing could be done. 
 
_____ 54.  I tried to keep my feelings from interfering with other things too much. 
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_____ 55.  Wished that I could change what had happened or how I felt. 
 
_____ 56.  I changed something about myself. 
 
_____ 57.  I daydreamed or imagined a better time or place than the one I was in. 
 
_____ 58.  Wished that the situation would go away or somehow be over with. 
 
Not   Used    Used   Used 
Used                     Somewhat                 Quite A Bit                  A great deal 
 
   0       1        2           3 
 
 
_____ 59.  Had fantasies or wishes about how things might turn out. 
 
_____ 60.  I prayed. 
 
_____ 61.  I prepared myself for the worst. 
 
_____ 62.  I went over in my mind what I would say or do. 
 
_____ 63.  I thought about how a person I admire would handle this situation and used  
       that as a model. 
 
_____ 64.  I tried to see things from the other person’s point of view. 
 
_____ 65.  I reminded myself how much worse things could be. 
 
_____ 66.  I jogged or exercised. 
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Appendix B 
 
Permission to Access AORN Database 
 
 
 
From: Garth Jordan [gjordan@aorn.org] 
Sent: Friday, May 20, 2005 12:35 PM 
To: Robin Chard, MSN, RN, CNOR 
Cc: Amy Hughes 
Subject: RE:  
 
Importance: High 
 
Hi Robin - 
 
This should not be a problem.  You will work directly with Amy Hughes to get a FREE 
random sample of our list - 700 nurses total (with the potential for another 700, if 
necessary).  All I ask in return is that you send us a sample of the mailing that will be 
going out.  Please call Amy directly next week (she's out of the office today) at 
800.755.2676, extension 202. 
 
You may consider this e-mail AORN's written permission for use of the described data.  
Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance as you work on this project. 
 
Garth Jordan, MBA 
Association of periOperative Registered Nurses Vice President, Product Marketing and 
Sales 1.800.755.2676, extension 238 gjordan@aorn.org www.aorn.org   
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Appendix C 
 
Newsletter Announcement 
 
Some periop nurses to receive survey in mail as part of AORN member’s study — AORN 
member Robin Chard, RN, MSN, CNOR, of Hollywood, Fl. and doctoral candidate at Duquesne 
University School of Nursing, is conducting a survey to find the definitions, causes and reactions 
to nursing errors. This is Chard’s dissertation study on nursing errors in the perioperative 
environment. The survey will be mailed to some AORN members for their input. Chard received a 
research grant from the AORN Foundation to complete the study, which she said is the first to 
seek answers on nursing errors from perioperative nurses themselves. As part of her study, 
randomly selected AORN members will receive a letter from Chard in the coming weeks, 
informing them that they have been selected to participate in a study and will be receiving a 
questionnaire on perioperative nursing errors. About a week later, the same nurses will receive 
the questionnaire and a self-addressed, stamped return envelope. Chard estimates that the 
survey will take 20 to 30 minutes to complete. The survey is completely confidential and 
all participants will remain anonymous. Chard plans to have results from the study in spring 2006, 
and she plans to submit an article on the study to the AORN Journal for publication.  
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Appendix D 
 
Demographic Sheet 
 
1. Age in Years on Last Birthday 
 
 ________________________ 
 
2. Gender 
a. Female 
b. Male 
 
3. Race 
a.  Non-Hispanic White 
b. Non-Hispanic Black 
c. Hispanic/Latino 
d. Asian & Pacific Islander 
e. American Indian & Alaska Native 
 
4. Marital Status 
a. Single 
b. Married 
c. Living with a significant other 
d. Divorced 
e. Widowed 
 
5. Level of Education 
a. Diploma 
b. Associate degree 
c. Bachelor degree in nursing 
d. Bachelor degree in other field 
e. Master’s degree in nursing 
f. Master’s degree in other field 
g. Doctorate in nursing 
h. Doctorate in other field 
 
6. Present Position 
 
 _______________________ 
 
7. Certified Perioperative Nurse (CNOR) 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
 
   
    
121 
 
Appendix E 
Perioperative Nurse Questionnaire 
PERIOPERATIVE NURSE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
We know that some errors are made (very often unintentionally) in the delivery of 
nursing care in the perioperative environment.  We can learn from them and improve the 
quality of nursing care.  This study is designed to define intraoperative nursing errors, 
find out the types of errors that registered nurses make, identify who or what is 
responsible for causing the errors, and determine the most constructive way to deal with 
them. 
 
 
I. What do we mean by nursing errors? 
 
Nursing errors may be defined as decisions, omissions, or acts: 
 
1. for which you felt responsible; 
2. which caused or could have caused distress to the patient; 
3. which had adverse or potentially adverse consequences for the patient; 
4. which would have been judged wrong by knowledgeable peers at the time 
they occurred. 
 
II. What do we mean by “close call”? 
 
 A “close call” is an event or situation that could have resulted in a patient’s 
 accident or injury, but didn’t, either by chance or by timely intervention. 
 
Definitions of Error 
Q1. How well does each of the following define types of intraoperative nursing 
errors? (For each item, please select the response that best applies by placing a 
check in the corresponding box) 
 Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
a. Was unclear about surgical site     
b. Improperly placed ESU pad     
c. Improper patient positioning     
d. Miscalculated dose or strength of medication      
e. Inaccurate, incomplete, or absent surgical count     
f. Break in sterile technique     
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g. Retained foreign object     
h. Equipment misuse related to lack of knowledge     
i. Lack of appropriate equipment     
j. Blood or blood product transfusion reaction     
k. Incorrect surgical prep     
l. Was unaware of patient allergy     
m. Misidentified a patient     
 
n. Any other   (Please specify)…………………………………………………… 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
 
Q2. Do you consider a “close call” the same as an error? (Circle the number of 
 your answer.) 
 
1 Yes, but only if there is direct patient harm 
2 Yes, regardless of patient outcome 
3 No, regardless of patient outcome 
4 Not sure 
 
Q3 (a) Have you committed an intraoperative nursing error? (Circle number.) 
  
1 have not committed an intraoperative nursing error (skip to Q-22)  
2 committed an intraoperative nursing error  
    
 
  
  
 (b) When did the error occur?  (Circle number.) 
 
1 In last 6 months 
2 7-12 months        
3 more than 1 and up to 2 years ago 
4 more than 2 and up to 4 years ago 
5 more than 4 years ago 
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Circumstances of the Error 
 
Q4 How many years of perioperative nursing experience did you have when the 
error was made? (Circle number.) 
 
1 6 months to 2 years 
2 3-6 years 
3 7-10 years 
4 more than 10 years 
 
Q5 How old was the patient (Circle number.) 
1 Less than 18 years old 
2 18-64 years old 
3 65 or older 
 
Q6 In which surgical procedure did the error occur: 
 
 ……………………………………………………………………. 
Q7 What was the patient’s overall level of functioning prior to the error (Circle 
number.) 
 
1 Fully functioning 
2 Mildly compromised functioning 
3 Moderately compromised functioning 
4 Severely compromised functioning 
 
Q8. Did the error occur immediately prior to or after administration of an  
 anesthetic? 
 
1 Prior 
2 After 
3 Not applicable 
 
Q9. How was the patient affected by the error? (Circle number.) 
 
1 Not at all     
2 Mildly   
3 Moderately   
4 Severely   
5 Very severely   
6 Don’t know 
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Causes of the Error 
The next group of questions is about perceived causes of the error 
(For each item, please select the response that best applies) 
 
Q10 The error occurred because: 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
a. I was unfamiliar with the procedure at that time 
    
b. Though I was responsible, someone else made the mistake 
    
c. I didn’t have the information I should have known 
    
d. I made up my mind too quickly in deciding what to do 
    
e. I was distracted  
    
f. The supervision by the managers was inadequate 
    
g. Staffing levels were inadequate 
    
h. There was a lack of appropriate equipment or supplies 
    
i. I was tired 
    
j. The system I worked under was defective 
    
k. I did not follow standard policy and procedure 
    
l. I was not properly oriented 
    
m. There was miscommunication among team members 
    
n. I had too many things to do at once 
    
 
o. Any other   (Please specify)……………………………………………………… 
 
Q11 How well does each of the following describe your error: 
 (For each item, please select the response that best applies) 
 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
a. My attention wandered 
    
b. I had a lapse of memory 
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c. I made the wrong decision 
    
d. I assessed the situation wrongly 
    
e. I missed the warning signs 
    
f. I gave inaccurate or inadequate information 
    
g. I relied on someone else’s judgment 
    
h. I acted beyond my competence 
    
i. I did not communicate well enough 
    
 
j. Other (Please specify) ………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Q12 How well does each of the following describe the atmosphere in the operating 
room (OR) at the time of the error?  
 (For each item, select the response that best applies) 
 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
a. The environment in the OR was particularly stressful 
    
b. There was conflict among the staff in the OR 
    
c. Managers just expected you to get on with the work regardless 
    
d. Taking “short cuts” was almost the norm in the OR 
    
e. It was common practice to be short staffed 
    
f. There was not enough communication among the staff in the OR 
    
 
g. Other  (Please specify) …………………………………………………………… 
 
Reactions to the Error: 
 
Q13 As a result of the error: 
 (For each item, select the response that best applies) 
 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
a. I was angry with myself 
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b. I was angry at other people 
    
c. I felt inadequate 
    
d. I was fearful of repercussions 
    
e. I felt guilty 
    
f. I was indifferent 
    
g. I felt embarrassed 
    
h. I felt devastated that I may have hurt 
    someone 
 
    
i. I believe that my actions were reasonable 
    
j. I became depressed 
    
  
k. Others  (please specify) …………………………………………………………… 
 
Q14 Did you talk to anyone about the error?    
 
1 Did not talk with anyone (Skip to Q-16)  
 2 Did talk with someone 
 
 
 
 
 
Q15 To whom did you talk about the error? (Circle number.) 
 (Select all responses that apply) 
 
 1 Nurse manager/supervisor 
 2 One of your colleagues 
 3 Physician 
 4 Non-nursing friend 
 5 Member of your professional organization 
 6 The patient 
 7 The patient’s relative  
 8 Your spouse or significant other 
9 Other  (Please specify)  ………………………… 
 
Q16. If NO, why not? (Circle number.) 
 
 1 I was worried what others might think 
 2 I was fearful of repercussions 
   
    
127 
 
 3 I didn’t think it was important 
 4 There was no harm to the patient 
 
 
Coping with the Error: 
 
Q17. When you made the error, what strategies did you use to cope? 
 (For each item, please select the appropriate response) 
 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
a. I criticized or lectured myself 
    
b. I went on as if nothing had happened 
    
c. I tried to keep my feelings to myself 
    
d. I accepted sympathy and understanding from someone 
    
e. I tried to forget the whole thing 
    
f. I made a plan of action and followed it 
    
g. I didn’t let it get to me;  I refused to think about it too much 
    
h. I asked a relative or friend I respected for advice 
    
i. I kept others from knowing how bad things were 
    
j. I talked to someone about how I was feeling 
    
k. I knew what had to be done, so I doubled my efforts to make things work 
    
l. I tried to keep my feelings from interfering with other things too much 
    
m. I wished the situation would go away or somehow be over 
    
n. I had fantasies about how things might turn out 
    
o. I promised to do things differently next time 
    
p. I apologized or did something to make up 
    
 
q. Any other coping strategies used (please specify)…………………………… 
   
……………………………………………………………………………… 
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Q18. Interaction with management staff  (Circle number.) 
  
 1 No interaction with management staff (Skip to Q-20) 
 2 Interaction with management staff 
  
 
 
 
 
(a) Did you discuss the error with management staff? 
   
1 YES 
2 NO 
 
(b) Were you counseled for the error?      
 
1 YES  
2 NO   
  
(c) Were you disciplined for the error?     
 
1 YES 
2 NO 
 
Q19. After discussion of the error with a manager  
 (Please select all responses that apply) 
 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
a. I lost professional respect 
    
b. I felt supported for the way the case was handled 
    
c. I felt humiliated 
    
d. The real cause of the error was not tackled 
    
e. The action taken against me far outweighed the seriousness of the error 
    
f. I felt I was used as a scapegoat 
    
g. I believed that steps would be taken to prevent future, similar errors 
    
h. Overall, the administration was judgmental about my mistake 
    
i. I maintained my sense of competence 
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j.      Any other responses (please specify)__________________________________________________ 
 
 
Changes in practice due to the error: 
 
Sometimes an error may change the way you practice.  To what extent do the 
following statements reflect how you reacted to the error? (For each item, select the 
response that best applies) 
 
Q20. As a direct consequence of having made the error: 
 
  
Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
a. I asked my colleagues what they would have done in a similar 
situation 
    
b. I pay more attention to detail 
    
c. I feel less confident in my work 
    
d. I tried to read the patient’s chart more carefully 
    
e. I got more worried 
    
f. I am less trusting of others’ capability 
    
g. I am more likely to seek advice 
    
h. I keep better documentation on the patients 
    
i. I am more likely to keep an error to myself if at all possible 
    
j. I do more observations on patients 
    
k. I follow policies and procedures more carefully 
    
l. I listen to patients more closely 
    
m. I try to avoid similar patients or procedures or both 
    
n. I slow down more 
 
    
o. I thought about leaving nursing 
 
    
 
p. Made some other changes in my practice (please specify)………………………… 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q21. Overall, thinking about this error, to what extent would you say it has had an 
 effect on your practice: (Please select one) 
 
Not at all A little Quite a bit A great deal 
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Demographics 
 
Q22. What is your marital status? (Circle number.) 
 
 1 Single 
 2 Married 
 3 Living with a significant other 
4 Divorced 
5 Widowed 
 
Q23. What is your age in years as of your last birthday? 
 
 ________________________ 
 
Q24. What is your gender? (Circle number.)      
 
1 Female 
2 Male  
 
Q25. What is your race? 
  
1 Non-Hispanic White 
2 Non-Hispanic Black 
3 Hispanic/Latino 
4 Asian & Pacific Islander 
5 American Indian & Alaska Native 
 
 
Q26. What is your present position? (no names please) 
  
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Q27. What is your highest level of education? (Circle number.) 
 
 1 Diploma 
 2 Associate degree 
3 Bachelor’s degree in nursing 
4 Bachelor’s degree in other field 
5 Master’s degree in nursing 
6 Master’s degree in other field 
7 Doctorate in nursing 
8 Doctorate in other field 
 
Q28. Are you a certified perioperative nurse (CNOR)? (Circle number.)  
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1 YES  
2 NO 
 
Q29. I would welcome any additional comments you might have. 
(Please use the space below or additional paper if required to write your 
comments) 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing and returning this questionnaire. Please place the 
questionnaire in the self-addressed return envelope. 
 
PLEASE Do NOT place your own name or return address on the envelope. All data 
will have to be discarded if there are any identifying characteristics on the questionnaire 
and/or return envelope. 
 
 
Once again, thank you for your assistance. 
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Appendix F 
Permission to Use Instrument, What Do We Learn From Our Mistakes? 
From: Jewel Crum-Freeman [jcrum-fr@jhsph.edu] 
Sent: Friday, January 09, 2004 2:08 PM 
To: rrchard@mindspring.com 
Subject: Permission to use instrument 
last month you requested from Dr. Albert Wu use of his instrument for your dissertation research.
please find attached a "pdf" version of the instrument.
if you are unable to open it, please provide me with a fax number and i can fax it to you.
thanks.
Jewel Crum-Freeman (for Dr. Albert Wu)

	
	
Administrative Assistant
Johns Hopkins University
Dept of Health Policy & Management
Health Services Research & Dev Center
624 North Broadway
Baltimore MD  21205
410.955.6564 (voice) / 410.955.0470 (fax)
jcrum-fr@jhsph.edu (email)
	
	

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Appendix G 
Permission to Use Instrument, Inappropriate Nursing Decisions and Actions 
From: Meurier Clency [CLENCY.MEURIER@northampton.ac.uk] 
Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2003 5:10 AM 
To: 'Robin Chard, MSN, RN, CNOR' 
Subject: RE: Nursing error tool 
 
Dear Robin, 
 
I am happy for you to make the necessary revisions of the questionnaire 
I 
used for my 'Learning from errors in nursing practice study'. I wish 
you the 
best of luck in your research. 
 
I do not know whether this e-mail response will be satisfactory. I can 
write 
a letter if necessary. 
 
 
Dr C. Meurier 
Yelvertoft 208 
Centre for Healthcare Education 
University College Northampton 
Northampton NN2 7AL 
England 
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Appendix H 
Permission to Use Instrument, Ways of Coping 
 
Dear Colleague: 
The Ways of Coping that was revised in 1985 is in the public domain and you do not 
need special permission to use it. In 1988 the Consulting Psychologists Press made minor 
modifications to a few items. Their version is copyrighted, and has since been purchased 
by Mind Garden. If you wish to use their version and/or their scoring service, you’ll need 
permission from Mind Garden. You can reach them at http://www.mindgarden.com/ or 
Mind Garden, Inc., 1690 Woodside Road, Suite 202, Redwood City, CA 94061, USA, 
(650-261-3500). You might also want the manual for the Ways of Coping. It is available 
through the same publisher.   
Sincerely, 
 
Susan Folkman, Ph.D. 
Professor of Medicine 
Director, Osher Center for Integrative Medicine at UCSF 
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Appendix I 
 
Content Validity Request 
 
Robin Chard, MSN, RN, CNOR 
	
	





	 !!"
	#$%&%'($

October 24, 2003 
 
Dear: 
 
Thank you again for agreeing to review the tool and providing feedback relating 
to its content validity.  As I previously mentioned in my e-mail, the tool was 
originally used in 1991 by Wu et al. on internal house medical officers and was 
redesigned in 1997 by Meurier & Parmar for a sample of British ward nurses.   
Meurier sent me his revised version of the tool but he did not have any 
reliability/validity data since his data from the study was lost in a computer crash.  
Reliability data from the original tool is available on the items related to coping 
with the error (items 15-17). 
 
My intent is for the tool to provide data relating to the following research 
questions: 
 
1. how do nurses define intraoperative nursing errors 
2. how do nurses assign responsibility for intraoperative nursing errors 
3. how do nurses respond to committing errors 
4. do nurses change their practice after committing errors 
 
I ask that you rate the items using the content validity index except for the ways 
of coping items. Please review the entire tool and rate those areas specific to 
perioperative nursing, in particular, items under #7, #8, and #9.  The items under 
#7 are from AORN’s Commission on Patient Safety.  The items under #9 were 
constructed to reflect research question #2-how do nurses assign responsibility 
for intraoperative errors.  Of course, I would welcome any feedback related to 
any and all items since this is my first experience.  If you wish, please feel free to 
rate those items not particular to perioperative nursing and add any items you 
feel would be relevant.  My goal is to provide a tool that will adequately reflect an 
ability to measure the dimensions of the construct.  Please let me know if you 
have any questions or comments. Thank you. 
 
Robin Chard 
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Appendix J 
Content Validity Index 
Content Validity Index    Name of Reviewer:       
 
Please rate items on a 4-point scale (from 1 = not relevant to 4 = very relevant) 
 
Definitions of error 
7. How well does each of the following define types of intraoperative 
nursing errors? 
 
 
Causes of the error 
 
The next group of questions are about perceived causes of the error 
 (For each item, please select the response that best applies)  
 
  
1 = 
 not 
relevant 
 
 
2 = 
somewhat 
relevant 
 
3 = relevant 
 
4 =  
very 
relevant 
 Wrong site surgery     
 Patient burn     
 Improper patient positioning     
 Medication error     
 Incorrect surgical count     
 Break in sterile technique     
 Retained foreign object     
 Equipment malfunction related to lack of knowledge     
 Lack of appropriate equipment     
 Blood or blood product transfusion error     
 Incorrect surgical prep     
 Incorrect surgical consent     
 Lack of appropriate surgical consents     
 Incorrect patient identification     
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9. The error occurred because: 
 
 
10. How well does each of the following describe your error: 
 
 
 
1 = 
 not relevant 
 
 
2 = 
somewhat 
relevant 
 
3 = relevant 
 
4 =  
very 
relevant 
 My attention wandered 
    
 I had a lapse of memory 
    
 I made the wrong decision 
    
 I assessed the situation wrongly 
    
 I missed the warning signs 
    
 I gave inaccurate or  inadequate information 
    
 
 
1 = 
 not relevant 
 
 
2 = 
somewhat 
relevant 
 
3 = 
relevant 
 
4 =  
very relevant 
 I was unfamiliar with the procedure at that time 
    
 Though I was responsible, someone else made the mistake 
    
 I didn’t have the information I should have known 
    
 I made up my mind too quickly in deciding what to do 
    
 I was distracted by having too many things to do at once 
    
 The supervision by the managers was inadequate 
    
 Staffing levels were inadequate 
    
 There was a lack of appropriate equipment or supplies 
    
 I was tired 
    
The system let me down 
    
 I did not follow standard policy and procedure 
    
 I was not properly oriented  
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 I relied on someone else’s judgment 
    
 I acted beyond my competence 
    
 
11. How well does each of the following describe the atmosphere in the 
operating room (OR) at the time of the error? 
 
 
Reactions to the error: 
 (For each item, select the response that best applies) 
12. As a result of the error: 
 
  
 
Coping with the error: 
 
  15. When you made the error, what strategies did you use to cope? 
  (For each item, please select the appropriate response) 
 
 
 
 
1 = 
 not relevant 
 
 
2 = 
somewhat 
relevant 
 
3 = relevant 
 
4 =  
very 
relevant 
 The environment in the OR was particularly stressful 
    
 There was bad feeling between the staff in the OR 
    
 Managers staff just expected you to get on with the work regardless 
    
 Taking “short cuts” was almost the norm in the OR 
    
 It was common practice to be short-staffed 
    
 
 
1 = 
 not relevant 
 
 
2 = 
somewhat 
relevant 
 
3 = relevant 
 
4 =  
very 
relevant 
 I was angry with myself 
    
 I was angry at other people 
    
 I felt inadequate 
    
 I was fearful of repercussions 
    
 I felt guilty 
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1 = 
 not relevant 
 
 
2 = 
somewhat 
relevant 
 
3 = relevant 
 
4 =  
very 
relevant 
 I criticized or lectured myself 
    
 I went on as if nothing had happened 
    
 I tried to keep my feelings to myself 
    
 I accepted sympathy and understanding from someone 
    
 I tried to forget the whole thing 
    
 I made a plan of action and followed it 
    
 I didn’t let it get to me; I refused to think about it too much 
    
 I asked a relative or friend I respected for advice 
    
 I kept others from knowing how bad things were 
    
I talked to someone about how I was feeling 
    
 I knew what had to be done, so I doubled my efforts to make things work 
    
 I tried to keep my feelings from interfering with other things too much 
    
 I wished the situation would go away or somehow be over 
    
 I had fantasies about how things might turn out 
    
 
17. After discussion of the error with a manager.  (Please select all responses 
that apply) 
 
 
1 = 
not relevant 
 
 
2 = 
somewhat 
relevant 
 
3 = relevant 
 
4 = 
very 
relevant 
 I lost professional respect 
    
 I felt supported for the way the case was handled 
    
 I felt humiliated 
    
 The real cause of the error was not tackled 
    
 The action taken against me far outweighed the seriousness of the error 
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 I felt I was used as a scapegoat 
    
 
Changes in practice due to the error: 
 
Sometimes an error may change the way you practice.  To what extent do the 
following statements reflect how you reacted to the error. 
 (For each item, select the response that best applies) 
 
18. As a direct consequence of having made the error: 
 
 
 
 
1 = 
not relevant 
 
 
2 = 
somewhat 
relevant 
 
3 = relevant 
 
4 = 
very 
relevant 
 I asked my colleagues what they would have done in a similar situation 
    
 I pay more attention to detail 
    
 I feel less confident in my work 
    
 I try to read the patient’s chart more carefully 
    
 I get more worried 
    
 I am less trusting of others’ capability 
    
 I am more likely to seek advice 
    
 I keep better documentation on the patients 
    
 I am more likely to keep an error to myself if at all possible 
    
 I do more observations on patients 
    
 I follow policies and procedures more carefully 
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Appendix K 
Institutional Review Board Approval 
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Appendix L 
First Mailing 
 
Date 
Dear Perioperative Nursing Colleague: 
 
My name is Robin Chard and as a doctoral student in nursing as well as a member of 
AORN, I am asking for your participation in a research study titled, Definitions, Causes, 
and Reactions to Intraoperative Nursing Errors. Your name was randomly chosen from 
the national AORN database. Within the next few days, you will receive a request to 
complete a questionnaire.  
 
Because patient safety is a major concern to perioperative nursing, this study is being 
conducted to learn more about how perioperative nurses like you answer questions 
related to the definitions, causes, and reactions to nursing errors. I am very interested in 
gaining information from the perspective of you, the perioperative nurse.  
 
I would greatly appreciate your taking the time to complete and return your 
questionnaire. 
 
Thank you in advance for your help. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Robin Chard, MSN, RN, CNOR 
Doctoral Candidate 
Duquesne University School of Nursing 
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Appendix M 
Second Mailing 
 
Date  
Dear Perioperative Nursing Colleague: 
Patient safety and reducing error in the workplace have always been primary concerns for perioperative 
nurses.  In an effort to collect information on how perioperative nurses, such as yourself, view nursing 
errors, you are being asked to participate in a research study by responding to the enclosed questionnaire, 
Perioperative Nurse Questionnaire. Your name was randomly selected from the national membership of 
AORN. 
 
By answering and returning the questionnaire, you are giving consent to participate.  Please note that 
participation is totally voluntary and there are no consequences for non-participation.  There are no 
anticipated risks to participation. There is no compensation for participation; however, participation in the 
research study will require no monetary cost to you.   
 
In order that the results of the study represent you, the perioperative nurse, it is important that each 
questionnaire be completed in its entirety and returned in the envelope provided. It should take 
approximately 30 minutes of your time to complete the questionnaire. Care has been taken to assure that 
the information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous. In order to assure 
confidentiality and anonymity, please follow the instructions below.  
 
1. Do not write your name or any identifying information anywhere on the questionnaire. 
2. Do not place a return address on the enclosed stamped envelope that you will use to return the 
completed questionnaire.  
Thank you very much for your participation in this research study. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Robin Chard, MSN, RN, CNOR 
Doctoral Candidate 
Duquesne University School of Nursing 
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Appendix N 
Postcard 
 
Dear Perioperative Nursing Colleague: 
 
Recently, you received a questionnaire about intraoperative nursing errors. Your name 
was randomly selected from the national membership of AORN. 
 
If you have already completed and returned the Perioperative Nurse Questionnaire, 
please accept my sincere thanks. If not, please do so today. I am very grateful for your 
help because I believe your response is critical in addressing the issues of patient safety.  
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Robin Chard, MSN, RN, CNOR 
Doctoral Candidate 
Duquesne University School of Nursing 
1017 North 13th Terrace 
Hollywood, FL 33019 
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